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PREFACE
This project could not have been completed without the aid and dedication of others.
First, I express gratitude to my friends and family who have supported me through the process in
one way or another directly or indirectly. I also wish to acknowledge all the past and present
faculty members and instructors of the University of Connecticut Department of Political
Science who have spurred my interest in this discipline: Thomas Noggle, Professor David Yalof,
Professor Elizabeth Hanson, Professor Robert Freysinger, Professor Garry Clifford, Professor
Howard Reiter, and Daniel Stockemer. I would like to thank Professor Kristen Kelly for her help
on a seminar paper that inspired segments of this thesis, and Professor Jeffrey Dudas for his
assistance in running the Senior Seminar and as the Departmental Honors advisor. And most of
all, I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Charles Venator Santiago, for all of the
time and effort he put into critiquing my work and providing valuable insight into my project.
Professor Venator made the focus of my project clear when I felt I was struggling, and I certainly
could not have completed the project without his guidance and assistance.
I sincerely hope that this thesis helps us to better understand the complex relationship
between race and sexual orientation in this country. There are people all over the world who
suffer oppression because of some or several immutable characteristics, and there should be no
rest until one day, there truly is equal protection for all.
This thesis is dedicated to all who suffer oppression, in any way, shape, or form.
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Beyond Racial Precedents: Loving v. Virginia as an Appropriate Legal Model and Strategy for
Same-Sex Marriage Litigation
ABSTRACT:
This thesis explores how LGBT marriage activists and lawyers have employed a racial
interpretation of due process and equal protection in recent same-sex marriage litigation. Special
attention is paid to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Loving v. Virginia, the landmark case that
declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. By exploring the use of racial precedent in
same-sex marriage litigation and its treatment in state court cases, this thesis critiques the racial
interpretation of due process and equal protection that became the basis for LGBT marriage
briefs and litigation, and attempts to answer the question of whether a racial interpretation of due
process and equal protection is an appropriate model for same-sex marriage litigation both
constitutionally and strategically. The existing scholarly literature fails to explore how this issue
has been treated in case briefs, which are very important elements in any legal proceeding. I will
argue that through an analysis of recent state court briefs in Massachusetts and Connecticut,
Loving acts as logical precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage. I also find, more
significantly, that although this racial interpretation of due process and equal protection
represented by Loving can be seen as an appropriate model for same-sex marriage litigation
constitutionally, questions remain about its strategic effectiveness, as LGBT lawyers have moved
away from race in some arguments in these briefs. Indeed, a racial interpretation of Due Process
and Equal Protection doctrine imposes certain limits on same-sex marriage litigation, of which
we are warned by some Critical Race theorists, Latino Critical Legal theorists, and other
scholars. In order to fully incorporate a discussion of race into the argument for legalizing samesex marriage, the dangers posed by the black/white binary of race relations must first be
overcome.

3

The time may come, far in the future, when contracts and arrangements between persons of the
same sex who abide together will be recognized and enforced under state law. When that time
comes, property rights and perhaps even mutual obligations of support may well be held to flow
from such relationships. But in my opinion, even such a substantial change in the prevailing
mores would not reach the point where such relationships would be characterized as
"marriages". At most, they would become personal relationships having some, but not all, of the
legal attributes of marriage. And even when and if that day arrives, two persons of the same sex,
like those before the Court today, will not be thought of as being "spouses" to each other within
the meaning of the immigration laws. For that result to obtain, an affirmative enactment of
Congress will be required.1

1

Chief Judge Irving Hill, in Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (1980)
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INTRODUCTION
Few issues have created more passion and division among the American public than the
current debate surrounding the legalization of same-sex marriage. Growing out of the gay rights
movement, the movement to legalize same-sex marriage has gained popularity over the past
decade as the perceived chief goal of the gay rights movement. This movement has inspired
hundreds of rallies around the country, including large marches in Washington,2 as well as
intense debate among many Americans.
This debate has enormous political, legal, and social implications within the United
States; the debate has called into question the citizenship of gay and lesbian individuals, and
whether they can be considered full members of society if not eligible for all the benefits of
marriage provided to others.3 These questions of citizenship bring up debates over equality and
the equal rights provisions of the U.S. and state constitutions. Do opposite-sex marriage laws
violate constitutional equal protection guarantees by prohibiting same-sex couples from
marrying? Indeed, these political, legal, and social implications became more notable after the
Massachusetts Supreme Court decision in 2003 that declared same-sex marriage legal in that
state. The issue of same-sex marriage was extremely salient in the 2004 presidential election;
some scholars assert that the proposed constitutional amendments to ban same-sex marriage on
the ballot in several states may have cost the election for Democratic candidate Senator John

2

See Roehr, Bob. "National Equality March Draws 100,000 to DC. (cover story)." Bay Area Reporter, October 15,
2009: 1, 12. The article reports that about 100,000 LGBT people and their supporters joined the National Equality
March on October 11, 2009 in District of Columbia (DC) that calls for action to correct the second-class citizenship
of gays.
3
See Concannon, Liam. "Citizenship, Sexual identity and social exclusion: Exploring issues in British and
American social policy." International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 28, no. 9-10 (2008): 326-339.; Edgar,
Gemma. "Engaging with the State: Citizenship, Injustice, and the Problem with Queer." Gay and Lesbian Issues and
Equality Review 4, no. 3 (December 2008): 176-187.
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Kerry by turning out the Christian right in greater numbers.4 Moreover, recent state court
decisions on the legality of same-sex marriage have great effects on the legal rights and benefits
of those in same-sex relationships as couples, as well as on the social acceptance of their
relationships. Married couples are entitled to many legal benefits like tax deductions and easier
access to medical coverage for both individuals. Debates over civil partnerships and civil unions
have focused on whether these civil unions go far enough in extending these legal benefits to
same-sex couples, and whether they encourage the same level of social acceptance of same-sex
unions as marriages have.5
The same-sex marriage and gay rights debates can be viewed as one strand of the larger
civil rights movement in America. The civil rights movement has involved battles of equality
and acceptance both legally—through debates of due process and equal protection—and socially
for many historically disadvantaged groups. These groups have been disadvantaged based on
their race, religion, national origin, gender, and sexual orientation, to name a few, and have
employed due process and equal protection arguments in their struggles for relief and redress.
The differing factors causing the disadvantages of these groups invite comparisons between these
groups in their civil rights experience. In this thesis, I focus on the relationship between race and
sexual orientation in the context of the civil rights movement, specifically the impact of race on
the same-sex marriage debates that have grown out of the gay rights movement.

4

See Lewis, Gregory B. "Same-Sex Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Election." PS: Political Science and Politics
(American Political Science Association) 38, no. 2 (April 2005): 195-199.; Campbell, David E., and J. Quin
Monson. "The Religion Card: Gay Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Election." Public Opinion Quarterly 72, no. 3
(Fall 2008): 399-419.
5

See Brandzel, Amy L. "Queering Citizenship? Same-Sex Marriage and the State." GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and
Gay Studies 11, no. 2 (2005): 171-204.; Edgar, Gemma. "Engaging with the State: Citizenship, Injustice, and the
Problem with Queer." Gay and Lesbian Issues and Equality Review 4, no. 3 (December 2008): 176-187.; Shainker,
Andrew J. "Civil Partnerships Vs. Full Marriage Rights." Echo Magazine, February 19, 2009: 28.
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This thesis explores how Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) marriage
activists and lawyers, specifically the organization Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders
(GLAD), have employed the Supreme Court’s opinion in Loving v. Virginia,6 the landmark case
that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional, in recent same-sex marriage litigation.
By exploring the use of a race-based interpretation of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses in same-sex marriage case briefs, this thesis critiques the racial interpretation of due
process and equal protection as applied to same-sex marriage litigation and attempts to answer
the question of whether Loving, the legalization of interracial marriage, is an appropriate model
for same-sex marriage litigation both constitutionally and strategically. The existing scholarship
fails to look at case briefs and instead relies on court opinions and the similarity of arguments
between racial and same-sex marriage debates. Thus, I will argue that through an analysis of the
appellant briefs submitted in two recent state court opinions, a racial interpretation of due
process and equal protection can act as precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage.
More importantly, however, I find that although a racial case like Loving can be seen as an
appropriate model for same-sex marriage litigation logically and constitutionally, questions
remain about its strategic effectiveness. I suggest that as evidenced by these briefs, same-sex
marriage legal activists should take care in how they approach race in their arguments. Activists
have tried to stay away from race in their arguments, but in particular instances still need to scale
back their racial interpretation of due process and equal protection doctrine as applied to samesex marriage litigation. The danger of using this racial interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine is inherent in the Black/White binary model of civil rights discourse, which argues that
racial minorities, specifically blacks, represent the model minority group and that all other

6

388 U.S. 1 (1967)

7

minority groups must compare their experience of oppression to that of blacks to be eligible for
certain civil rights.7
Chapter I explores the history behind the gay rights movement and the same-sex marriage
debates and their relation to miscegenation. The context of this project is provided in a
discussion of the current state of same-sex marriage in the United States. Chapter II details the
scholarly literature on this topic, explains the importance of examining case briefs, and provides
an overview of the project methodology. Chapters III and IV examine the appellant briefs
submitted in two recent state court opinions dealing with same-sex marriage, Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health8 and Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health,9 respectively.
These chapters provide an analysis of the racial arguments included in the briefs, through the
plaintiffs’ claims of Due Process, Equal Protection, and their treatment of the definitional
argument that consumes the same-sex marriage debate. Chapter V attempts to summarize and
highlight my findings by tying together the briefs submitted in both cases. I find a sort of
evolution in how the plaintiffs in the two cases treat the potential limitations on the use of Loving
as precedent for same-sex marriage litigation, and suggest that their use of a racial interpretation
of due process and equal protection in both cases may reflect a growing recognition of the
dangers imposed by the black/white binary model of race relations. I find that my conclusions
7

For an overview of the black/white binary, see Perea, Juan F. "The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The
Normal Science of American Racial Thought." California Law Review 85, no. 5 (October 1997): 1213.; Moran,
Rachel F. "Neither Black Nor White." Harvard Latino Law Review 2, Fall 1997: 61-99.; Delgado, Richard, and Jean
Stefancic. Critical Race Theory: An Introduction. New York: New York University Press, 2001.; Kim, Janine
Young. "Are Asians Black: The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the
Black/White Paradigm." Yale Law Journal 108 (1998-1999): 2385.; Alcoff, Linda Martin. "Latino/As, Asian
Americans, and the Black-White Binary." The Journal of Ethics 7, no. 1 (2003): 5-27. For a discussion of the
dangers imposed by the binary on same-sex marriage litigation, see Hutchinson, Darren Leonard. "Out Yet Unseen:
A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse." Connecticut Law Review 29, Winter
1997: 561.; Schacter, Jane S. "The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents."
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 29 (Summer 1994): 283.; Kendell, Kate. "Race, Same-Sex
Marriage, and White Privilege: The Problem with Civil Rights Analogies." Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 17,
2005: 133-137.
8
440 Mass. 309 (2003)
9
289 Conn. 135 (2008)
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represent the scholarship of Darren Hutchinson and Jane Schacter, who have argued for an
approach to same-sex marriage litigation that does not force a comparison of LGBT and AfricanAmerican oppression.10 I also suggest that the plaintiffs look to the scholarship of Professor
William Eskridge11 and employ his historical approach to combating certain arguments against
same-sex marriage. I conclude by suggesting possibilities for further research.

10

See Hutchinson, Darren Leonard. "Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and
Political Discourse." Connecticut Law Review 29, Winter 1997: 561.; Schacter, Jane S. "The Gay Civil Rights
Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents." Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 29
(Summer 1994): 283.
11
William Eskridge is Professor of Law at Yale Law School. For his examination of same-sex unions throughout
world history, see Eskridge, William N. Jr. "A History of Same-Sex Marriage." Virginia Law Review 79, 1993:
1419, 1507.
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I.

HISTORY AND CONTEXT

Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents.
And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.12
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this
classification…There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications
violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause… These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty
without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13

When exploring any research question, a thorough understanding of the historical debates
surrounding the research topic is essential in order to provide background and frame the current
debate in an historical context. This chapter explores the historical foundations that led to the use
of equal protection and due process claims in same-sex marriage litigation. First, I will document
the history of miscegenation laws in the United States. I will then cover the history of the Gay
Rights Movement in the United States, including early same-sex marriage litigation and court
decisions. In the final section, I will provide context for this project by discussing more recent
same-sex marriage litigation and where the same-sex marriage debate stands today. This chapter
provides an overview of the history of how the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment have been used in court opinions dealing with interracial marriage
and same-sex marriage, and provides context for my investigation into the use of a racial
interpretation of these clauses in recent same-sex marriage litigation. I find that the equal
protection and due process arguments employed in same-sex marriage litigation emerged from
miscegenation arguments, and that the emergence of these arguments from a racial history
framed current debates over the appropriateness of the use of race in same-sex marriage
litigation.

12
13

Virginia Trial Judge Leon Bazile, as quoted by the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3
Chief Justice Earl Warren, in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12
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A. Miscegenation
This section addresses the history of interracial marriage in the United States, including
an overview of court decisions that eventually made anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional.
These court decisions concerning interracial marriage included equal protection and due process
arguments that then emerged in court decisions concerning same-sex marriage later in the 20th
century. The history of miscegenation law helps to frame the current debate over same-sex
marriage by providing a historical foundation of the central arguments surrounding the same-sex
marriage debate and by showing how these arguments emerged from racial debates.
Many states in the United States had legal restrictions on interracial marriage in the 18th,
19th, and early 20th century. In 1776, seven out of the 13 original colonies that had declared their
independence had laws barring interracial marriage. These early laws were often defended with
racist interpretations of the bible.14 Northern states gradually abolished slavery after America’s
independence, but anti-miscegenation laws were still enforced in many of these states. As the
United States expanded westward, all new slave states as well as some new free states enacted
laws banning interracial marriage. Some southern states temporarily repealed or left unenforced
their anti-miscegenation laws during the Reconstruction era, but these laws were reenacted and
enforced once again along with Jim Crow laws after white conservative Democrats took power
after Reconstruction. Several northern and western states permanently repealed their antimiscegenation laws during the 19th century.15

14

The story of Noah’s curse on his son Ham became a biblical justification for American slavery and segregation, as
Ham came to be known as the ancestor of black Africans. See Haynes, Stephen R. Noah's Curse: The Biblical
Justification of American Slavery. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
15
For data showing the dates that anti-miscegenation laws were enacted and repealed for each state as well as the
specific text and statute titles of these laws, see: Loving Day. Legal Map: Accessible Version. 2009.
http://www.lovingday.org/legal-map-accessible (accessed February 9, 2010). For the interactive map, see
http://www.lovingday.org/legal-map.
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Three federal constitutional amendments to ban interracial marriage throughout the
country were introduced in Congress; none were ever enacted. In 1871, Representative Andrew
King of Missouri proposed an amendment because he feared the fourteenth amendment banning
slavery would eventually be extended to ban interracial marriage. In December of 1912,
Representative Seaborn Roddenbury of Georgia introduced a similar amendment. Roddenbury’s
amendment was more severe, however, as it included the “one-drop rule,” which meant that
anyone with any trace of African blood was barred from marrying a white spouse. In 1928,
Senator Coleman Blease of South Carolina proposed an amendment that was even more severe;
his amendment required that Congress set a punishment for interracial couples who attempted to
get married and for people who officiated an interracial marriage.
In Pace v. Alabama,16 the United States Supreme Court ruled that anti-miscegenation
laws were constitutional, and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. constitution.
The court found that both races were treated equally, because both whites and blacks suffered
equal punishment for violating laws against interracial marriage and interracial sex. The
plaintiffs argued that Section 4189 of the Code of Alabama violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it imposed a more severe penalty on interracial couples
who marry or live in adultery or fornication together than does Section 4184 of the same code,
which imposed a penalty on any man or woman who live together in adultery or fornication.17
The Court found no discrimination against a specific race in the two sections of the Alabama
Code in question:
There is in neither section any discrimination against either race. Section 4184 equally includes the offense
when the persons of the two sexes are both white and when they are both black. Section 4189 applies the
16

Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)
The penalty for same-race couples living together in adultery or fornication was a $100 fine and possible
imprisonment or hard labor for no more than six months (See Code of Alabama, Section 4184). The penalty for
mixed-race couples who married or lived together in adultery or fornication was imprisonment or hard labor at least
2 and no more than 7 years (See Code of Alabama, Section 4189).
17
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same punishment to both offenders, the white and the black. Indeed, the offense against which this latter
section is aimed cannot be committed without involving the persons of both races in the same punishment.
Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the two sections is directed against the
offense designated and not against the person of any particular color or race. The punishment of each
offending person, whether white or black, is the same.18

By framing an offense committed by two people of the same race, whether white or black, as
separate from an offense committed by two people of different races, the Court justified the
difference in the severity of punishment between the two offenses and found no discrimination
against a specific race. The punishment for the first offense was the same for white couples as it
was for black couples, and the punishment for the second offense was the same for both people
involved in the relationship, whether white or black. We see here the equal application theory of
equal protection at work: Because the punishment was equally applied to both races, the Court
was able to rule that no discrimination against a specific race was present, and thus the law was
upheld. We will see this equal application argument in later same-sex marriage cases, used in
defense of anti-same-sex marriage statutes.
In 1948, the California Supreme Court in Perez v. Sharp19 ruled California’s antimiscegenation statute unconstitutional. The petitioners, a white woman and black man, were
denied a marriage license by the County Clerk of Los Angeles County based on Civil Code,
Section 69: “no license may be issued authorizing the marriage of a white person with a Negro,
mulatto, Mongolian or member of the Malay race.” The petitioners argued that this statute denied
their free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the constitution because they were not able to
“participate fully in the sacraments of that religion.”20 The Court, stating that the First
Amendment’s religion clauses were “encompassed in the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth

18

106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883)
Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711 (1948)
20
Ibid., 713

19
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Amendment,” cited Skinner v. Oklahoma,21 in which marriage was determined a fundamental
right. Wrote the Court:
Since the right to marry is the right to join in marriage with the person of one's choice, a statute that
prohibits an individual from marrying a member of a race other than his own restricts the scope of his
choice and thereby restricts his right to marry. It must therefore be determined whether the state can restrict
that right on the basis of race alone without violating the equal protection of the laws clause of the United
States Constitution.22

Citing several previous opinions regarding racial discrimination, including Yik Wo v. Hopkins,23
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,24 Hill v. Texas,25 and Hirabayashi v. United States,26 the Court
concluded that “a state law prohibiting members of one race from marrying members of another
race is not designed to meet a clear and present peril arising out of an emergency.”27 The Court
addressed the equal application argument presented in support of anti-miscegenation laws (also
employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pace). The argument, of course, is that the antimiscegenation laws do not discriminate against any racial group because it applies equally to
people of all races; just as whites are prohibited from marrying blacks, blacks are prohibited
from marrying whites. “The decisive question, however,” wrote the Court,
is not whether different races, each considered as a group, are equally treated. The right to marry is the
right of individuals, not of racial groups. The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution does
not refer to rights of the Negro race, the Caucasian race, or any other race, but to the rights of
individuals…In construing the equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution, the United States
Supreme Court has declared that the constitutionality of state action must be tested according to whether
the rights of an individual are restricted because of his race.28

21

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The Court in Skinner called marriage “one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”
22
Perez, at 715
23
118 U.S. 356 (1886). Yik Wo v. Hopkins, in which the denial of permits to Chinese laundry business owners was
challenged, was the first time a law that was race-neutral on its face but administered in a discriminatory manner
was ruled a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
24
271 U.S. 500 (1926)
25
316 U.S. 400 (1942)
26
320 U.S. 81 (1943)
27
Perez, at 716
28
Perez, at 716, internal citations omitted.
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The Court discussed several prior cases in which separate but equal facilities were ruled as nondiscriminatory, such as travel on trains,29 because they adequately furnished all individuals with
“substantially equal treatment”30 in spite of separate facilities. However, the Court found that this
ruling was “clearly inapplicable to the right of an individual to marry. Since the essence of the
right to marry is the freedom to join in marriage with the person of one's choice, a segregation
statute for marriage necessarily impairs the right to marry.”31 The Court also found no public
interest or matter of legitimate concern to the state that requires the prohibition of interracial
marriage. For example, the state has a legitimate interest in prohibiting people infected with
dangerous transmittable diseases from marrying; however, any statute proscribing such a
prohibition “must be based on tests of the individual, not on arbitrary classifications of groups or
races, and must be administered without discrimination on the grounds of race.”32 The sections
of the California Civil Code in question were not motivated by a state interest in preventing the
transmission of disease or any other legitimate concern; rather they “make race and not disease
the disqualification…By restricting the individual's right to marry on the basis of race alone, they
violate the equal protection of the laws clause of the United States Constitution.”33
The Court also examined the history of the arguments in support of the sections of the
California Civil Code in question to determine whether there are “exceptional circumstances”34
to justify the prohibition of mixed-race marriage. The Court found that the arguments in support
of the statutes included the assumption that other races are inferior to the Caucasian race, and
that mixed-race marriages are “unnatural” and lead to undesirable offspring that are “inferior” to

29

See McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914)
Perez, at 717
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid., at 718
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid., at 719
30
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the offspring of same-race marriages.35 And the respondent in Perez tried to justify the statutes in
question by arguing that “the prohibition of intermarriage between Caucasians and members of
the specified races prevents the Caucasian race from being contaminated by races whose
members are by nature physically and mentally inferior to Caucasians.”36 The Court found the
argument that non-Caucasians are physically inferior to Caucasians to be “without scientific
proof,” and furthermore “fails to take account of the physical disabilities of Caucasians and…
variations among non-Caucasians.”37 In response to the claim that other races are mentally
inferior to Caucasians, the Court found that “there is no certain correlation between race and
intelligence,” there have been intelligent and mentally inferior individuals in all races, and “the
Legislature has not made an intelligence test a prerequisite to marriage.”38 Note that the Court
again appealed to an analysis of the individual over the generalization of an entire race based on
stereotypes or differences often due to environmental factors. The respondents argued that
people wishing to intermarry often come from the “dregs of society,” would produce children
that would be a burden to the community, and also that interracial marriage would result in racial
tension within the community. The Court found that there is no law that prohibits marriage
among members of the “dregs of society, while also noting that this term cannot be defined and
could not be defined on the basis of race alone. It rejected the respondents’ claim of the adverse
effects of interracial marriage on progeny, noting that the respondents relied on Buck v. Bell,39 a
case which dealt with the mentally ill and is not applicable here. The Court also cited Buchanan
v. Warley,40 in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that although preservation of the public

35

Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 324 (1869)
Perez, at 722
37
Perez, at 723
38
Perez, at 724
39
274 U.S. 200 (1927)
40
245 U.S. 60, 81, (1917), addressing racial segregation in residential areas.
36

16

peace was desirable, “this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights
created or protected by the Federal Constitution.” Race tension cannot be stopped by keeping
laws that segregate by race and were influenced by the same racial prejudices that caused the
race tension in the first place, argued the Court. In this case, “A member of any [race]…may find
himself barred by law from marrying the person of his choice and that person to him may be
irreplaceable.”41 The Court therefore concluded that “careful examination of the arguments in
support of the legislation in question reveals that ‘there is absent the compelling justification
which would be needed to sustain discrimination of that nature.’”42 Furthermore, found the
Court, “the fact alone that the discrimination has been sanctioned by the state for many years
does not supply such justification.”43
The Court also stated that any law that regulates a fundamental right, such as marriage,
must be clear in its purpose for regulating that right. It argued that the statute in question is “too
vague and uncertain to be upheld as a valid regulation of the right to marry”44 because the
“legislature has made no provision for applying the statute to persons of mixed ancestry.”45 In
summarizing its opinion, the Court stated the following:
In summary, we hold that sections 60 and 69 are not only too vague and uncertain to be enforceable
regulations of a fundamental right, but that they violate the equal protection of the laws clause of the United
States Constitution by impairing the right of individuals to marry on the basis of race alone and by
arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminating against certain racial groups.46

In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Loving v. Virginia47 that prohibitions on
interracial marriage were unconstitutional. This ruling effectively voided the remaining laws that
prohibited miscegenation in seventeen states; all of them were southern states and they included
41
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all the former slave states plus Oklahoma. Like the California Supreme Court did in Perez, here
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the equal application argument and found that laws prohibiting
interracial marriage violated both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The plaintiffs in Loving were convicted of violating sections 20-58 and 20-59 of the
Virginia Code, which prohibited marriage between a white person and a non-white person under
penalty of one to five years in prison and subjected any couple who left Virginia to be married
and then returned to the state to this same penalty.
The Court acknowledged the state’s reliance on Pace v. Alabama to support its equal
application argument, but rejected this reasoning and cited its opinion in McLaughlin v.
Florida,48 which had rejected equal application in the case of interracial cohabitation. Wrote the
Court:
Because we reject the notion that the mere "equal application" of a statute containing racial classifications
is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious
racial discriminations, we do not accept the State's contention that these statutes should be upheld if there is
any possible basis for concluding that they serve a rational purpose.49

The Court also found that the state’s purpose in upholding the anti-miscegenation statute was
clearly directed at maintaining white supremacy, calling the statute in question “obviously an
endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy.”50 Also, “The fact that Virginia prohibits only
interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must
stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”51 The
Court cited the opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, which had affirmed the
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plaintiffs’ conviction and relied on its prior opinion in Naim v. Naim52 where the preservation of
Virginia citizens’ racial integrity and the prevention of “the corruption of blood,” “a mongrel
breed of citizens,” and “the obliteration of racial pride” were deemed legitimate purposes of the
state.53 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had also reasoned that marriage should be
regulated exclusively by the state without federal intervention, and relies on Maynard v. Hill54
and the Tenth Amendment. But, argued the Supreme Court in Loving, the State did not claim that
“its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding…the Fourteenth Amendment,”55
and that it cannot do so considering the opinions in Meyer v. Nebraska56 and Skinner v.
Oklahoma.57 The state argued instead, as paraphrased by the Supreme Court, that “the meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by the statements of the Framers, is only that state
penal laws containing an interracial element as part of the definition of the offense must apply
equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each race are punished to the same
degree.”58 The state concluded from this reasoning that because the statutes in question punish
equally both the white and black participants in an interracial marriage, “these statutes, despite
their reliance on racial classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon
race.”59 The state advanced a second argument, which assumed the validity of the equal
application theory; the state argued that if the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit antimiscegenation laws because of their reliance on a racial classification, then “the question of
constitutionality would thus become whether there was any rational basis for a State to treat
interracial marriages differently from other marriages.” The state argued that the scientific
52
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evidence was in doubt and therefore, the Supreme Court should defer to the wisdom of the state
legislature regarding its policy toward interracial marriages.
The Supreme Court in Loving rejected the state’s equal application argument, noting that
the Fourteenth Amendment had traditionally required “a very heavy burden of justification” for
statues containing racial classifications. The court admitted that equal application may be enough
to justify statutes involving non-racial discrimination, including Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
New York60 and Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers,61 in which the court had “merely asked
whether there is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom
of the state legislatures.”62 However, in Loving, the burden of justification was so high because it
involved a racial discrimination that equal application is inapplicable.
The state refers to statements made in the Thirty-ninth Congress during the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment to argue that the Framers of the Amendment did not intend for the
Amendment to make state laws that prohibit miscegenation unconstitutional. However, the Court
argued, these statements “pertained to the passage of specific statutes, and not to the broader,
organic purpose of a constitutional amendment.”63 Furthermore, the Court referred to three prior
cases in which statements made in Congress during the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
were considered. In Brown v. Board of Education,64 the Court called these statements
“inconclusive [at best],” adding that “the most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments
undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among ‘all persons born or
naturalized in the United States.’”65 On the other hand, “Their opponents…were antagonistic to
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both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments, and wished them to have the most limited
effect.”66 The Court also relied on its opinions in Strauder v. West Virginia67 and McLaughlin v.
Florida, and concluded the following:
We have rejected the proposition that the debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress or in the state legislatures
which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment supported the theory advanced by the State, that the requirement
of equal protection of the laws is satisfied by penal laws defining offenses based on racial classifications so
long as white and Negro participants in the offense were similarly punished.68

The Court cited McLaughlin again to note that it rejected the reasoning in Pace v. Alabama that
supported equal application: “Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause
which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court.”69 Citing a long list
of precedent, the Court stated that “the clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States.”70 It
required that the Court consider, for all classifications, whether the statute in question
“constitute[s] an arbitrary and invidious discrimination.”71
There is no question, the Court found, that “Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely
upon distinctions drawn according to race. The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if
engaged in by members of different races.”72 Because this classification involved race, it was
subject to the “most rigid scrutiny,”73 and, in order to be upheld, “must be shown to be necessary
to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial
discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.”74 The Court
noted that two of its members previously stated in McLaughlin that they “cannot conceive of a
66
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valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the color of a person's skin the test of whether his
conduct is a criminal offense.”75 Thus, the Court concluded here that because the purpose of
these anti-miscegenation statutes was clearly to maintain white supremacy since the statutes only
prohibited interracial marriage involving white people,
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies
this classification…There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial
classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.

The Court also found that the statutes in question violated the plaintiffs of liberty without due
process because “the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”76 It cited Skinner and Maynard,
which called marriage “one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence
and survival.”77 The Court referred to a “freedom of choice to marry,” which cannot be restricted
by invidious racial discriminations, and stated that this freedom to marry or not marry a person
of another race “resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the state.”78
The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Loving v. Virginia rendered unenforceable all
remaining state restrictions on interracial marriage. However, South Carolina and Alabama did
not formally amend their constitutions to remove language prohibiting interracial marriage until
1998 and 2000, respectively. 62 percent of voters in South Carolina and 59 percent of voters in
Alabama voted to remove this language from their respective constitutions.79 Approval of
interracial marriage by Americans has risen gradually in the past 50 years and since the Loving
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opinion, according to Gallup polls.80 A June 2007 poll indicated 77 percent approval for
marriage between a white person and a black person and 17 percent disapproval, which is the
highest overall approval and lowest overall disapproval since Gallup started the poll in
September 1958 (The 1958 poll indicated a mere 4 percent approval and 94 percent disapproval).
Blacks still approve of interracial marriage at a higher rate (85 percent) than whites, a trend that
has been apparent since blacks were first included in this poll in 1968.
A history of miscegenation in the United States shows a reliance on due process and
equal protection arguments. Court opinions in cases like Pace v. Alabama, Perez v. Sharp, and
Loving v. Virginia were based on these arguments and whether restrictions against interracial
marriage violated due process and equal protection provisions of the U.S. and state constitutions.
Due process and equal protection claims for the legalization of same-sex marriage emerged from
this history, as we will see in the next section.

B. The Gay Rights Movement and Early Same-Sex Marriage Litigation
This section highlights the major events of the gay rights movement and the early wave
of same-sex marriage litigation. An exploration of the historical foundations of the gay rights
movement provides background to the origins of the same-sex marriage movement. A look at the
first wave of same-sex marriage litigation reveals the emergence of race-based due process and
equal protection arguments applied to same-sex marriage debates. This history sets up a view of
the evolution of race-based Fourteenth Amendment interpretations from early to more recent
same-sex marriage litigation. This history also highlights a major difference between
miscegenation debates and early same-sex marriage debates: the emergence of the definitional
80
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argument against same-sex marriage, which has become a central component of recent LGBT
marriage debates, litigation, and court decisions.
The first major event that gave a public voice to the LGBT rights movement was the
founding of the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee in Berlin in 189781. This committee
published literature and advocated legal reform in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, and
their founder82 opened the Institute for Sexual Science in 1919, which specialized in sex
research. This committee’s work resulted in some degree of freedom for gays and lesbians in the
Weimar Republic, although Hitler’s rise to power put a stop to their work. Other organizations
formed in the early 20th century that gave some voice to gays and lesbians included the British
Society for the Study of Sex Psychology83 and the Society for Human Rights in the United
States.84
Gay and lesbian political activity was still not very visible despite the work of these
organizations, but this began to change during World War II. During the war and its aftermath,
many more young people came to the cities and more visibility was achieved by the movement.
Many additional organizations were formed, including the Culture and Recreation Centre85 in
Amsterdam, and the Mattachine society86 and the Daughters of Bilitis87 in the United States. A
national gay periodical, ONE: The Homosexual Magazine, began publication in 1953. In 1954
the Los Angeles Postmaster declared the October issue of ONE obscene and undeliverable and
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the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed88; however, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit
Court’s decision89, citing Roth v. United States90, in the first explicit Supreme Court ruling on
homosexuality.
A routine raid by two detectives and several police officers of the Stonewall Inn in New
York’s Greenwich Village on the night of June 27, 1969 set off rioting in what is now considered
one of the major milestones in the gay rights movement.91 As police escorted patrons out of the
bar, a crowd of angry onlookers gathered on the street outside the inn and battled with police,
using coins, beer bottles, and sticks92. Although the Stonewall Riots did not solely initiate the
gay rights movement, this event “ultimately came to symbolize the overthrow of decades of
official harassment, repression, and degradation”; it also “changed history and breathed life into
the then dormant and internally conflicted homophile movement.”93 Stonewall did mark the
beginning of the modern, more national gay rights movement in the U.S.94
One year after the Stonewall Riots, in June 1970, a march was organized in New York
City to commemorate the Riots. Gay Pride is now celebrated around the world every year in
June. Shortly after the riots, gay organizations began to spring up in New York, California, and
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around the country.95 A new age of political and legal activism has begun for the gay rights
movement, particularly legal activism concerning marriage.
The movement to legalize same-sex marriage has become a major element of the gay
rights movement. The first such litigation effort resulted in Baker v. Nelson,96 a Minnesota
Supreme Court opinion which ruled that Minnesota law did not allow same-sex couples to
marry, and furthermore that the failure to allow same-sex couples to marry did not violate the
constitution. The court was not persuaded by the petitioners’ dual argument that prohibition of
same-sex marriage denies a fundamental right based on the ninth amendment, and deprives them
of liberty and property without due process and equal protection through the fourteenth
amendment. The court also rejected the petitioners’ reliance upon Loving v. Virginia97: “there is
a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the
fundamental difference in sex.”98 An appeal of Baker to the U.S. Supreme Court was dismissed
for want of a federal question. The next case that dealt with same-sex marriage took place in
1971. In Anonymous v. Anonymous, 99 the New York Supreme Court decided a case in which a
marriage was performed for two males where one of the males was thought to be a female. The
male thought to be a female (the defendant) later underwent an operation to have his
reproductive organs removed, and sent the medical bills to the petitioner. The court declared that
no marriage could legally have taken place between the plaintiff and the defendant based on the
definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman: “The law makes no provision for
a ‘marriage’ between persons of the same sex. Marriage is and always has been a contract
95
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between a man and a woman.”100 A 1973 Kentucky appellate court opinion101 defined marriage
as the union of one man and one woman, and stated that the purpose of marriage was to found
and maintain a family, making same-sex marriage impossible by definition. Jones v. Hallahan
relied heavily on the Minnesota court’s decision in Baker and the New York court’s opinion in
Anonymous. The court refused to authorize the issuance of a marriage license to a couple who
were both female because what they proposed was not a marriage. Additionally, it found “no
constitutional sanction or protection of the right of marriage between persons of the same
sex.”102 The 1974 Washington appellate court opinion Singer v. Hara103 found that it was
“apparent from a plain reading of our marriage statutes that the legislature has not authorized
same-sex marriages”104 and that “same-sex relationships are outside of the proper definition of
marriage.”105 Because what the appellants proposed was not marriage, stated the court in Singer,
an argument to analogize Loving and Perez to same-sex marriage was inapplicable. In 1982, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Adams v. Howerton106, in affirming the decision of the district
court107, found that Congress rationally intended to deny preferential status to the spouses of
homosexual marriage, perhaps “because homosexual marriages never produce offspring, because
they are not recognized in most, if in any, of the states, or because they violate traditional and
often prevailing societal mores.”108 Furthermore, “Congress's decision to confer spouse status …
only upon the parties to heterosexual marriages has a rational basis and therefore comports with
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the due process clause and its equal protection requirements.”109 The district court’s opinion had
relied on Baker, Anonymous, Hallahan, and Singer as precedent in affirming that marriage by
definition is a union of a man and a woman, and therefore same-sex marriage is impossible.
Because the “unvarying legal concept and definition” of marriage required persons of different
sexes, “there can be no equal protection or due process violation when persons of the same sex
attempt to bring themselves within the meaning of the term ‘marriage’ or ‘spouse.’ Whatever
classification may be involved is thus reasonable and proper.” 110 Howerton also placed great
emphasis on the importance of heterosexual marriage for procreation and perpetuation of the
human race: “It seems beyond dispute that the state has a compelling interest in encouraging and
fostering procreation of the race and providing status and stability to the environment in which
children are raised.”111 The court went on to say that the state has chosen the “least intrusive
alternative available to protect the procreative relationship”112 and that this classification is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
An examination of the history of early same-sex marriage litigation shows that race-based
due process and equal protection interpretations were used in these debates, but that courts
routinely rejected petitioners’ reliance on such interpretations based on the traditional definition
of marriage as a union of one man and one woman. The emergence of these race-based
interpretations in the first wave of same-sex marriage litigation helps to frame my examination of
more recent litigation in a historical context and show how the application of race-based
interpretations of due process and equal protection to same-sex marriage litigation has evolved
since 1970. This history also shows the origins of the definitional argument, how the treatment of
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this argument has evolved over time, and sets the stage for my suggestion of a better approach to
the definitional argument.

C. Recent Same-Sex Marriage Litigation (1990-2010) and the State of Same-Sex Marriage
Today
This section provides an overview of same-sex marriage litigation between 1990 and
2010 and context for the debate by explaining the state of same-sex marriage today. In recent
court opinions regarding same-sex marriage, those same race-based interpretations that were
present in the first wave of litigation and court opinions have been used again. However, unlike
in the first wave when courts rejected petitioners’ reliance on cases like Loving and Perez as
precedent to legalize same-sex marriage, many of these recent opinions have accepted racial
arguments to advance same-sex marriage. This section also looks at two cases central to the gay
rights movement that do not explicitly involve marriage, but that highlight the importance of due
process and equal protection arguments to both LGBT rights and same-sex marriage debates.
This final section of chapter I serves to introduce my examination of the use of race-based
interpretations of due process and equal protection in same-sex marriage litigation by LGBT
advocates, in order to see how these racial arguments have been employed in case briefs and how
these arguments can be further improved.
Hawaii was the first state in which a court ruled in favor of same-sex marriage. The
Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in its 1993 opinion Baehr v. Lewin113 that the state’s refusal to grant
marriage licenses to same-sex couples was discriminatory. The Court found that this practice
violated the equal protection clause of the Hawaii constitution based on gender discrimination,
and that classifications by gender are subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii constitution.
Thus, the statute in question was presumed to be unconstitutional “unless Lewin, as an agent of
113
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the State of Hawaii, can show that (a) the statute's sex-based classification is justified by
compelling state interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments
of the applicant couples' constitutional rights.”114 Lewin argued that the appellants could form a
marriage not because of state-sanctioned discrimination that may violate the equal protection
clause, but because “of their biologic inability as a couple to satisfy the definition of the status to
which they aspire,”115 a position that the Court rejected as “circular and unpersuasive.”116 Lewin
relied primarily upon four court decisions to support his argument: Baker v. Nelson, Jones v.
Hallahan, Singer v. Hara, and De Santo v. Barnsley.117 The Hawaii Court rejected his use of
these opinions. In Baker, the Minnesota court ruled that current state statutes did not authorize
same-sex marriage, which the Hawaii Court also found, and that the United States constitution
was not violated. “Apparently, no state constitutional questions were raised and none were
addressed,”118 observed the Hawaii Court; thus, Baker was distinguishable from Baehr.
Similarly, it found De Santo to be distinguishable from Baehr, as De Santo “held only that
common law same-sex marriage did not exist in Pennsylvania, a result irrelevant to the present
case.”119 The appellants in De Santo did claim a violation of equal rights under Pennsylvania’s
Equal Rights Amendment, but this was denied by the appellate court because the issue had not
been raised in the trial court. In Jones, the Hawaii court found it significant that “the appellants'
equal protection rights—federal or state—were not asserted in Jones, and, accordingly, the
appeals court was relieved of the necessity of addressing and attempting to distinguish the
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decision of the United States Supreme Court in Loving.”120 The Hawaii Court found the Loving
opinion to be vital to the same-sex marriage issue, stating the following:
The facts in Loving and the respective reasoning of the Virginia courts, on the one hand, and the United
States Supreme Court, on the other, both discredit the reasoning of Jones and unmask the tautological and
circular nature of Lewin's argument that HRS § 572-1 does not implicate article I, section 5 of the Hawaii
Constitution because same sex marriage is an innate impossibility. Analogously to Lewin's argument and
the rationale of the Jones court, the Virginia courts declared that interracial marriage simply could not exist
because the Deity had deemed such a union intrinsically unnatural, and, in effect, because it had theretofore
never been the "custom" of the state to recognize mixed marriages, marriage "always" having been
construed to presuppose a different configuration. … [T]rial judges are [not] the ultimate authorities on the
subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving amply demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or not,
that customs change with an evolving social order.121

In Singer v. Hara, the Washington appellate court did not dispute that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause required strict judicial scrutiny for sex discrimination.
However, it still did not declare Washington’s anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional based on
the same reasoning in Jones, that the nature of marriage excluded same-sex couples from the
institution. The Hawaii Court “reject[ed] this exercise in tortured and conclusory sophistry.”122
While finding that Hawaii’s refusal to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples
violated the state’s Equal Protection Clause, the Court rejected the appellants’ due process claim
that they have a right to same-sex marriage:
We do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience
of our people that failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. Neither do we believe that a right to same-sex
marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it
were sacrificed. Accordingly, we hold that the applicant couples do not have a fundamental constitutional
right to same-sex marriage arising out of the right to privacy or otherwise.123

Although it rejected the due process claim, the Court vacated the decision of the circuit court and
remanded the case, ordering that “in accordance with the ‘strict scrutiny’ standard, the burden
will rest on Lewin to overcome the presumption that HRS § 572-1 is unconstitutional by

120

Ibid., at 567
Ibid., at 569-570
122
Ibid., at 571
123
Ibid., 556-557
121

31

demonstrating that it furthers compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights.”124 In Baehr v. Miike125 the Hawaii Court again
ruled on this issue, declaring that the defendant was unable to prove that there was a compelling
state interest behind his refusal to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and that therefore
his refusal was unconstitutional. In 1998, however, Hawaii voters approved a state constitutional
amendment that gave the Hawaii legislature the power to ban same-sex marriage, and the
legislature passed a bill that did so.
In 1996, Congress passed and President Bill Clinton signed into law the Defense of
Marriage Act,126 which stated that no state would be required to legally recognize a same-sex
marriage that was performed in another state, and that the federal government defined marriage
as the union of one man and one woman. It is interesting to note that President Clinton, who in
1996 declared himself opposed to the legalization of same-sex marriage,127 appears to have
changed his opinion on this issue based on recent remarks in 2009.128 President Barack Obama’s
2008 campaign platform included a full repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act,129 but the Justice
Department filed an amicus brief supporting the constitutionality of DOMA in 2009.130 The
Justice Department stated that it was merely continuing its standard practice of defending
existing law.131 President Obama did actively campaign on the pledge to end the military’s
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“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” policy, and in his State of the Union Address on January 27, 2010, he
announced that he would work with Congress and the military during 2010 to “finally repeal the
law that denies gay Americans the right to serve the country they love because of who they
are.”132
Two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases that do not deal explicitly with same-sex marriage
but have been influential in several recent state court opinions regarding same-sex marriage
include Romer v. Evans133 and Lawrence v. Texas.134 In Romer, the Court used an equal
protection argument to strike down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited
all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexual persons from
discrimination. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, concluded that “Amendment 2
classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to
everyone else. This Colorado cannot do…Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection
Clause.”135 Amendment 2, he wrote, was a “status-based enactment” which had no “relationship
to legitimate state interests,” and was “a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake,
something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.”136 The state argued that Amendment 2
put gays and lesbians in the same position as all other citizens because it “does no more than
deny homosexuals special rights.”137 The Court rejected this argument and found that the
amendment actually “imposes a special disability upon those persons alone. Homosexuals are
forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint.”138 The Court also
found that Amendment 2 failed rational basis review because it “impos[ed] a broad and
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undifferentiated disability on a single named group, [which was] an…invalid form of
legislation,” and because it “lack[ed] a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”139
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy used a due process argument to strike down a Texas law
that banned sodomy between two males, while Justice O’Connor, in concurring, argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause should be controlling instead of the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause. Justice Kennedy’s opinion found an
individual liberty and privacy interest, stemming from substantive due process, to engage in
private conduct. In overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,140 the Court relied on Justice Stevens’
dissenting opinion in Bowers and argued that his opinion should be controlling here:
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the governing majority in a
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from
constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their
physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices
by unmarried as well as married persons.141

Justice O’Connor noted in her concurring opinion that the Texas laws made sodomy a crime only
if the participants engaging in sodomy were of the same sex, while sodomy between opposite sex
partners was not a crime. Thus, “Texas treats the same conduct differently based solely on the
participants,” and “those harmed by this law are people who have a same-sex sexual orientation
and thus are more likely to engage in [sodomy].” This law, she argued, “makes homosexuals
unequal in the eyes of the law by making particular conduct—and only that conduct—subject to
criminal sanction.”142 Texas argued that this discrimination served a legitimate state interest in
promoting morality. But Justice O’Connor rejected this argument, stating that “moral
disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection
139

Ibid, at 632
478 U.S. 186 (1986)
141
Lawrence, at 577-578 (citing Bowers, Justice Stevens dissenting, at 216)
142
Ibid., at 581
140

34

Clause because legal classifications must not be ‘drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the
group burdened by the law.”143 She found no legitimate state interest in a law that distinguished
between heterosexuals and homosexuals as applied to private, consensual conduct, and thus
concluded that it failed rational basis review. She added that her opinion did not mean “other
laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail under rational
basis review;” marriage laws, for instance, that distinguished between heterosexuals and
homosexuals had other reasons to be upheld “beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded
group.”144
The first state to legalize same-sex marriage was Massachusetts in 2003, following the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health.145 The California Supreme Court struck down a statewide ban on same-sex marriage in
2008 in In Re Marriage Cases146 based on an equal protection and due process analysis and strict
scrutiny, but California voters passed Proposition Eight on Election Day 2008, which established
a state constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage. Also in 2008, the Connecticut
Supreme Court declared a statewide ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional through equal
protection and due process analysis based on intermediate scrutiny in Kerrigan v. Commissioner
of Public Health.147 The Iowa Supreme Court in the 2009 case Varnum v. Brien148 ruled that
barring same-sex marriage violates the Equal Protection Clause of the state’s constitution; like
the Connecticut Supreme Court, it employed intermediate scrutiny to arrive at its opinion. In the
same month that Varnum was decided, the Vermont legislature overrode the governor’s veto of a
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bill that legalized same-sex marriage. In May 2009, the Maine legislature passed and the
governor signed into law a bill that legalized same-sex marriage, but Maine voters voted to
repeal the law on Election Day 2009. In June 2009, the New Hampshire legislature passed and
the governor signed into law a bill that legalized same-sex marriage.
As of May 2010, same-sex marriage is legal in and granted by five states: Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, and New Hampshire. 30 states have passed constitutional
amendments banning same-sex marriage, and twelve states have statutes that prohibit same-sex
marriage. New York, Rhode Island, and New Mexico all do not allow same-sex marriage, but
have no specific prohibition of such a marriage. New York recognizes same-sex marriages
performed in other countries. Several states that prohibit same-sex marriage by either statute or
constitutional amendment also allow same-sex civil unions that grant rights similar to marriage
or some form of limited rights.
We will see many of these arguments used in interracial marriage litigation and past
same-sex marriage litigation in our examination of the case briefs in Goodridge and Kerrigan;
Indeed, modern due process and equal protection claims in same-sex marriage litigation
originally emerged in debates over interracial marriage that eventually resulted in Loving v.
Virginia. By first discussing these past cases, we will find a sort of historical evolution between
how specific racial arguments were treated in the past and how they have been used in more
recent cases. And an exploration of cases like Perez and Loving will allow us to more fully
understand how and why same-sex marriage advocates employ a racial interpretation of due
process and equal protection in same-sex marriage litigation. The literature review, which I
present next, explores the scholarly treatment of these historical race-based debates as applied to
LGBT marriage litigation, and sets the stage for the main focus of this project.
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II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The existing scholarly literature on the use of race in the same-sex marriage legal debate
fails to examine case briefs, and mostly relies on court opinions and the general similarities and
differences between interracial marriage arguments and same-sex marriage arguments. But there
is no discussion of how LGBT advocates have actually employed racial arguments in same-sex
marriage cases, specifically in the briefs, and that is how I intend to contribute to the literature.
An examination of the existing scholarly literature reveals a broad range of perspectives
concerning the use of a racial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
and Due Process clauses to advance same-sex marriage litigation. Although the literature varies
greatly, three major and distinct arguments are evident. One school of thought supports the use
of a racial interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment clauses to advance same-sex marriage
litigation, while a second perspective argues that a racial interpretation as applied to same-sex
marriage litigation is an invalid legal analogy and thus should not be accepted by courts. A third
argument rests on a critique of marriage from within the queer community, which consists of the
belief that using a racial analogy to promote the legalization of same-sex marriage is a poor
strategy because a racial comparison reinforces the stereotype of gays as white, affluent, and a
politically powerful minority. The scholars that comprise this third argument disagree over
whether and when an allusion to racial civil rights issues should be used to promote same-sex
marriage litigation, but they agree that this racial comparison is potentially harmful to the gay
rights and same-sex marriage movements as it imposes certain risks. As I have mentioned, the
literature surrounding this issue focuses on court decisions and elements of similarity between
racial minorities and sexual orientation minorities, with little discussion of how same-sex
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marriage activists actually employ racial elements in their arguments. But I will outline the three
major perspectives in the existing literature, because these perspectives will be important in my
examination of case briefs later on when I look to see how these arguments have been used in the
briefs. I also explore the importance of case briefs in the American legal system; this is vital to
my project, as its major contribution to the scholarly literature is an examination of racial
approaches to same-sex marriage litigation through case briefs. Lastly, I provide the project
methodology, in which I explain specifically how I will undergo the project and contribute to the
existing scholarly literature.

A. A Racial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as Applied to Same-Sex Marriage
Litigation Provides an Appropriate Model

The literature that supports a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses as appropriate precedent to advance same-sex marriage litigation relies on
Loving v. Virginia. These scholars find that the use of the Equal Protection Clause in Loving for
the purpose of rejecting racial discrimination is an appropriate legal model for same-sex
marriage cases for the purpose of rejecting discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual
orientation. They contend that race and sexual orientation (and thus miscegenation and same-sex
marriage) are similar enough as characteristics of minority groups to be legally comparable, and
therefore the legalization of interracial marriage is appropriate precedent for the legalization of
same-sex marriage. Several of these scholars argue that the Equal Protection and Due Process
arguments in Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas also provide precedent for same-sex
marriage litigation.
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Trosino finds that and miscegenation same-sex marriage can and should be compared.149
In comparing interracial marriage to same-sex marriage, the he notes that gay couples face
similar legal obstacles to those faced by interracial couples in the 1960s. He finds that arguments
supporting prohibitions on interracial and gay marriage are unfounded, and outlines these
arguments: those against the legalization of interracial marriage include white supremacy, the
protection and sanctity of white womanhood, the prevention of mixed-race offspring, and a
feared loss of political power and sexual power over white women. Those arguments against the
legalization of same-sex marriage include the beliefs that homosexuality is unnatural, same-sex
marriage would encourage homosexuality, and same-sex marriage provides a confusing
environment in which to raise children. All of these arguments against same-sex marriage,
argues Trosino, are based on the beliefs that homosexuality is wrong and that heterosexuality is
superior to homosexuality. He concludes that many of the arguments against miscegenation and
same-sex marriage are “strikingly similar”,150 and that the courts should legalize same-sex
marriage based in large part on the legal history of interracial marriage. Although Trosino
focuses on the social dimension of this issue in examining the similarities of these arguments, the
similarities exposed set the framework for an equal protection argument. These arguments help
to show that gays and lesbians can be considered a “discrete or insular minority” on the basis of
sexual orientation with a history of discrimination and relative political powerlessness, just as
blacks are a discrete or insular minority on the basis of race because of their history of
discrimination and political powerlessness. These aspects of both minority groups are part of the
criteria for a suspect class under equal protection claims.
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Eskridge calls the similarities in the prohibitions against interracial and same-sex
marriage “clear. Virginia and other states relied on precisely the same definitional (marriage has
never included different-race couples), morality-based (God ordained this), and pragmatic
(people would be upset) arguments to prohibit different-race marriages that states now invoke to
prohibit same-sex marriages.”151 White supremacy is the ideology that underlay interracial
marriage prohibitions just as homophobia is the ideology that underlies same-sex marriage
prohibitions, and both ideologies “rest upon hate and fear.”152 Eskridge argues that same-sex
marriage can be legalized based on the Equal Protection argument in Loving. Because the
prohibition against same-sex marriage is a facial gender classification, he argues, it triggers
heightened scrutiny just as the racial classification did in Loving. This gender classification
cannot survive intermediate scrutiny because the “[state] justifications for prohibiting same-sex
marriage rest upon an ideology of homophobia and rigid gender stereotypes.”153 Eskridge states
that this prohibition may also deprive people of a fundamental right to marry under the Due
Process clause, although he admits that Loving is primarily an Equal Protection argument with a
very brief Due Process statement at the end; arguing for the legalization of same-sex marriage
based on the Due Process argument in Loving alone is difficult.
Opponents of same-sex marriage often argue that marriage is traditionally defined as a
union of one man and one woman; indeed, early same-sex marriage litigation efforts resulted in
court decisions that rejected the use of Loving as precedent based on this “traditional definition”
argument. Eskridge also attempts to show that historically, marriage has not always been defined
in this way and that same-sex unions have had significance in many cultures. Through a detailed
compilation of the history of marriage in many cultures and periods of world history, he finds
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that same-sex unions have been a “valuable human institution for most of human history and in
most known cultures.”154 The claim that the traditional definition of marriage is a union of one
man and one woman is an important argument to counter for advocates of interracial marriage as
a model for same-sex marriage litigation; if marriage truly is defined as a union of one man and
one woman, then it becomes much easier to argue that the Loving decision should have little
impact on same-sex marriage. The legalization of marriage between two persons of different
races would not change the definition of marriage from a union of two persons of opposite
gender to a union of two persons regardless of gender. This definitional argument also exposes
another similarity in the arguments against both interracial marriage and same-sex marriage:
opponents of interracial marriage argued that marriage was traditionally intended for same-race
couples and many courts used biblical citations to support this argument, just as opponents of
same-sex marriage argue that marriage was traditionally intended for opposite-sex couples and
cite bible verses and religion beliefs to support their argument.
In a later article, Eskridge builds upon his earlier arguments.155 He argues that the reasons
underlying the “analytically weak” arguments against gay marriage are cultural rather than
logical or analytical. “The arguments are so weak that they smack of prejudice more than reason,
and their appeal is certainly strong among homophobes,”156 he writes. He discusses the
definitional argument, the defense of marriage argument, and the stamp of approval argument
which includes the argument that gay marriage will promote homosexuality in children. In
analyzing several court opinions starting with Loving and citing Baehr v. Lewin, Zablocki v.
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Redhail, and Turner v. Safley, he attempts to show that legal precedent allows for the legalization
of same-sex marriage because the courts have applied strict scrutiny to marriage cases.
More recent scholarship has examined the Supreme Court’s rulings in Romer and
Lawrence and their implications for same-sex marriage legalization. Emond argues that the equal
protection analysis employed by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her Lawrence v. Texas
concurrence, if applied in the same way to a law barring same-sex marriage, would render the
law unconstitutional.157 The analysis used by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,158 he argues, is “very similar to the searching form of
rational review that Justice O'Connor suggested in Lawrence.”159 Reinheimer, in an attempt to
develop a substantive, gender-conscious approach to same-sex marriage grounded in equal
protection doctrine, finds that “the proscription of same-sex marriage operates to maintain
unconstitutional gender inequality to the detriment not only of LGBTQ…persons, but also of
women as a group.”160 He discusses extending the Loving analogy to fully incorporate its use of
equal protection into same-sex marriage cases, and concludes that applying the race-based equal
protection argument in Loving to same-sex marriage litigation shows that because same-sex
marriage prohibitions discriminate on the basis of sex, they are subject to intermediate scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Doctrine. In a later article, Reinheimer extends his discussion of
Loving’s Equal Protection argument and its application to same-sex marriage litigation to include
Lawrence. He argues that the miscegenation analogy is “both compelling and appropriate in the
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context of sodomy statutes.”161 He argues that the due process analysis employed in Lawrence
that focused on an individual liberty and privacy interest, although used so that legislatures could
not amend the law to simply apply to all persons and thus making it constitutional, actually
blunts the movement for same-sex marriage and poses dangers like increased sexual abuse.
Indeed, Lawrence has received attention in recent court opinions about same-sex marriage, but
the courts have hardly relied upon it in declaring that equal rights in the form of civil unions or
marriage must be applied to same-sex couples. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence also
ignores the facial sex discrimination, notes Reinheimer, and focuses on discrimination based on
sexual orientation. He advocates for a different equality approach to Lawrence that, he argues,
will pave the way toward same-sex marriage. The equality approach he suggests is a sex equality
approach derived from the court’s reasoning in Loving, which rejected the equal application
theory as part of the “separate but equal” doctrine: “Just as it was clear to the Loving Court that it
was sophistry to claim an anti-miscegenation law constituted equal treatment, so a few courts
have found that same-sex marriage prohibitions do in fact discriminate on the basis of sex.”162
Loving was also about sex discrimination, he argues, because anti-miscegenation laws served to
reinforce gender stereotypes in relationships by preserving white womanhood: “[white men]
were…concerned about black men having sex with white women, and losing their own sexual
access to black women.”163 By applying the equal protection analysis from Loving to Lawrence,
Lawrence becomes a major force in the movement to legalize same-sex marriage.
Polk argues that Montana’s marriage amendment that banned same-sex marriage is
unconstitutional based on both the equal protection analysis in Romer and the due process
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analysis in Lawrence.164 If the Supreme Court’s analysis and decisions in Romer and Lawrence
are applied to the Montana marriage amendment, she writes, the amendment should be found
unconstitutional. Barrett discusses the importance that recent state court decisions have placed on
children of same-sex couples, and analyzes this as a new approach to legalizing same-sex
marriage.165 He argues that only recently, the same-sex marriage debate has evolved into a
debate that centers not only on the rights of the couple in a same-sex relationship, but also on the
rights of the children who live with the couple. Barrett “advance[s] the possibility that this
repeated deference to…the child, will open up a challenge to anti-gay marriage laws and
constitutional amendments that has not previously been considered: an Equal Protection
challenge based on a child's right to presumed legitimacy at birth.”166
There has also been a great deal of scholarship on civil unions, namely whether civil
unions for same-sex couples would satisfy an equal protection claim by providing similar legal
rights to same-sex relationships as is provided to heterosexual marriages, or if the term
“marriage” must be applied to guarantee equal protection under the law.167 This literature often
touches on the notion that civil unions are “separate but equal,” which draws comparison to the
landmark racial segregation case Brown v. Board of Education.168 Yan argues that the New
Jersey constitution’s equal protection clause requires recognition of same-sex marriage.169 He
critiques the New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion in Lewis v. Harris,170 in which the court held
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that the state constitution required committed same-sex couples to receive the same statutory
rights as married couples, and asserts that a proper application of New Jersey equal protection
case law would have guaranteed full marriage rights to same-sex couples under the New Jersey
constitution. Howenstine provides another discussion of civil unions and the equal protection
clause,171 arguing that Romer advances gay rights and civil unions for same-sex couples but not
necessarily marriage. His argument is that because Class I anti-gay partnership laws (which bar
any and all same-sex partnership rights) demonstrate a desire to harm a politically unpopular
group (gays), these laws are subject to heightened rational basis review like the type of review
employed in Romer v. Evans. Howenstine writes that these laws are invalid under a more
searching form of rational basis review because “their expansive scope exceeds any rational
relation to legitimate governmental interests in marriage and the family.”172 Additionally, he
argues, class II anti-gay partnership laws which are more narrowly tailored to prohibit only
comprehensive partnership benefits like marriage, “more closely approximate the disputed
interests underlying the decision to bar same-sex couples from marrying.”173 The literature on
civil unions is particularly important to the Connecticut same-sex marriage case, Kerrigan v.
Commissioner of Public Health, because same-sex civil unions had already been legalized by the
Connecticut state legislature at the time the case was argued. Kerrigan, then, was essentially a
debate over whether civil unions satisfied the plaintiffs’ equal protection and due process claims.
The scholarship that advocates using a racial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as was
used in Loving to advance same-sex marriage litigation focuses on the Equal Protection clause;
although a few scholars include a due process argument, it is always coupled with a more
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confident Equal Protection argument. These scholars also reject the usefulness of Lawrence in
advancing same-sex marriage litigation, often arguing that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence or a
variation of her concurrence would be more useful than would Justice Kennedy’s opinion.
However, in many ways, this focus on Equal Protection reflects Loving, which relied mostly
upon an Equal Protection argument and in which the inclusion of a Due Process argument at the
end appears as a mere side note to the rest of the opinion. These scholars agree that the core
component of Loving, the Equal Protection argument, provides an appropriate legal model for
same-sex marriage legalization, and encounter no problems with a racial interpretation of the
Equal Protection clause as applied to same-sex marriage.

B. A Racial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is Not an Appropriate Model for
Same-Sex Marriage Litigation
Another school of thought argues that interracial marriage and same-sex marriage are not
similar and are not legally comparable; these scholars assert that Loving is not appropriate
precedent for same-sex marriage litigation today, and that the Warren Court’s decision in Loving
does not logically impel the legalization of same-sex marriage. Although the number of scholars
in this camp is small compared to the number who find compelling legal similarities between
Loving and same-sex marriage litigation, the literature in this area is focused and persuasive.
Using two main arguments, this literature counters constitutional claims for the legalization of
same-sex marriage, and argues that major differences exist between mixed-race and same-sex
marriage.
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Wardle counters the two main constitutional claims for the legalization of same-sex
marriage, the substantive due process claim and the equal protection claim.174 She argues that
there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage; the constitutionally recognized fundamental
right to marriage, she writes, does not apply to same-sex couples based on history, experience,
precedent, and the fact that the nature and meaning of marriage is exclusively heterosexual.
Furthermore, she argues that the constitutional zone of privacy does not extend to same-sex
marriage. In countering the equal protection claim for same-sex marriage, she states that these
arguments are flawed. She bases this assertion on a lack of scientific evidence that shows that
homosexual behavior is immutable and that biological immutability would not advance this
claim anyway. She also argues that both race and homosexual behavior and gender and
homosexual behavior are not equivalent legal categories, and rejects the Loving analogy. She
attempts to show that homosexual couples are not a discrete and insular minority, and concludes
that “no sound basis exists for constitutionalizing the same-sex marriage issue, either in
fundamental rights doctrine or in equal protection doctrine.”175 By eliminating the constitutional
issues, Wardle aims to encourage more debate on the policy issues and arguments surrounding
same-sex marriage.
Wilkins also counters the two major constitutional claims for same-sex marriage.176
While acknowledging that most literature on this topic finds that laws giving preference to
heterosexual marriage are irrational and subject to strict scrutiny, Wilkins argues the following:
With due respect, and knowing that the opinion expressed in this essay is in the decided academic minority,
the current consensus is seriously flawed…Laws preferring heterosexual marriage are not subject to strict scrutiny.
Statutory and other legal preferences for heterosexual marriage do not intrude upon a fundamental right nor are they
based on a suspect classification. Moreover, even if strict scrutiny is invoked, marriage survives judicial analysis
174
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because it furthers the most imperative of all governmental interests: “the very existence and survival of the human
race.” Current statutory and other legal preferences for heterosexual marriage, therefore, are plainly constitutional.177

Other opponents of the use of Loving as precedent for same-sex marriage litigation
engage the social dimension in arguing that there are major differences between mixed race and
same-sex couples. Coolidge argues that using the Loving/same-sex marriage analogy to support
the legalization of same-sex marriage is primarily a political use rather than a legitimate legal
argument, and therefore should have no basis in the legal debate surrounding gay marriage. He
writes that when proponents of same-sex marriage use the Loving analogy to support their cause,
they are playing “‘the race card’ of the marriage debate” (201). The author lays out several
“problems” (217) with this analogy; these problems with the analogy show that the two issues
and cases are “fundamentally different” (217). He focuses on the Loving and Baehr cases, and
notes several differences between these two cases. First, the contrast between Virginia’s and
Hawaii’s laws, specifically cohabitation laws; interracial couples were forbidden to cohabit in
Virginia, while in Hawaii same-sex couples were free to cohabit, make private contractual
promises, and receive institutional recognition.178 Second, Coolidge compares the two states:
while the state of Virginia was a “hotbed of racial polarization,”179 Hawaii “is hardly a hotbed of
anti-gay sentiment.”180 Looking at the specific marriage laws in each state, Coolidge finds that
Virginia’s anti-miscegenation laws stemmed from slavery and a “zealous campaign…aimed at
‘improving’ society.”181 If a black person and white person married, it was considered a felony.
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Hawaii’s marriage law, however, is “positive, not prohibitory”182 in that it “imposes no penalties
or other sanctions upon them…[R]elationships are not disturbed…by the law.”183 There were
other states in which the Lovings could marry, but same-sex couples could not marry in any state
when Baehr was heard. Coolidge argues that while southern anti-miscegenation laws ran counter
to the “Western tradition of marriage law,”184 the Baehr decision ran counter to this tradition; the
traditional definition of marriage as a union between one man and one woman is again important.
Yet another difference is the disagreement over the pursuit of legal marriage within the gay
community; there was little disagreement during Loving among the African-American
community. In Baehr, the plaintiffs created a huge public education campaign than ever existed
during Loving to teach the public about their cause, and Baehr occurred at the beginning of a
legal revolution while Loving was “the end of a process of constitutional and popular
deliberation stretching over decades.”185 Many gay and lesbian legal advocates were surprised by
the Baehr decision; Lambda Legal did not join the plaintiffs until after the 1993 decision, as it
exercised caution, as did other groups, in which cases it litigated and where as a matter of
strategy. Although there was considerable public attention given to the Loving decision, the
court’s ruling was somewhat expected: “The ruling…is important from the historical standpoint,
but few observers had entertained any serious doubts as to what the court would do on the issue...
The decision was in line with many others on racial matters that have been handed down in
recent years.”186 Coolidge also examines amicus briefs from the Japanese-American Citizens
League and the Roman Catholic Church, which each submitted briefs in both the Loving and
Baehr cases; both groups supported interracial marriage, but they disagreed on Baehr. A theme
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of Coolidge’s article is the argument that those who support the Loving analogy seek to
undermine democracy by subverting the majority will of the people. He also refers to slavery and
employs the argument that the oppression of black minorities was much more severe than the
oppression of gays ever was.
Wagner argues that anti-miscegenation laws were mostly viewed as racial laws rather
than marriage laws and should not influence the current legal debate over same-sex marriage.187
In arriving at this conclusion, Wagner employs an imaginary analogy between banking law and
marriage law to show that “the correctness of Loving v. Virginia does not logically compel the
correctness of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health”.188 This analogy, he writes, is based
on “the claim that sexual difference is no more relevant to the nature and purpose of marriage
than is racial sameness,”189 and that using Loving as a model for same-sex marriage litigation
would be “socially disastrous”.190
The scholars that disagree that a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses should influence same-sex marriage litigation employ the definitional argument
and avoid core constitutional issues by focusing on differences between Loving and same-sex
marriage cases, and racial minorities and sexual minorities. They also appeal to outdated beliefs
about the purpose of marriage in arguing that marriage is essential to the survival of the human
race because of its reproductive benefits.

C. The Dangers of a Racial Analogy
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Perhaps the most interesting perspective on the interracial/same-sex marriage analogy
comes from Law and Society literature and gay rights activists and queer theorists who oppose
legalizing marriage for same-sex couples for a variety of reasons. The arguments here rest on the
belief that this racial analogy would do more harm than good for the gay rights movement, and
this belief has enormous implications for the application of a racial interpretation of the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses to same-sex marriage litigation. It must be noted that these
scholars do not specifically answer the question of whether the racial interpretation in Loving
can or should be applied to same-sex marriage litigation; rather, their discussion of the
interconnections, or non-interconnections, between minorities with differing characteristics like
race and sexual orientation reveal possible limitations to using racial cases like Loving as
precedent for same-sex marriage litigation.
Foster questions the rise of legal marriage to the top of the gay rights agenda.191 She
argues that this increased push for same-sex marriage has nothing to do with the materialism of
marriage; rather, it lies in the symbolism of marriage as an institution. She examines the
importance of the symbolism of marriage through the lens of Critical Race Theory and previous
civil rights struggles of other oppressed groups and states the importance of particular strategies
at specific points in a group’s civil rights struggle. Foster asks who will benefit from the
legalization of gay marriage and what the overall costs will be for the movement, and poses the
possibility that the gay rights movement may eventually make the same mistakes the AfricanAmerican and feminist rights movements made in that they favored strategies that would achieve
rights largely affecting privileged members of that group.
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Kendell suggests that gays fear their own history and identity will not resonate enough
with Americans, so they display imagery of the black civil rights struggle. She argues that gays
should not use black civil rights analogies until white gays fight the stereotype of white/gay
privilege.192 Gays are largely displayed in popular culture as white and economically privileged,
and the use of a black civil rights analogy only reinforces this view; this harms the gay rights
movement overall. She alludes to Hutchinson’s argument in discussing the “intersectionality of
oppression,”193 and discusses the invisibility of queers of color in the movement. She calls the
depiction of the gay rights movement in popular culture “wrong” and “fundamentally counterproductive and undermining to [gay] liberation.”194 She also writes of the need to fight for
equality for all, “not just for queers, and not just when it comes to the right to marry.”195
Another aspect of literature relevant to this issue is Latino Critical theory, which began
with the purpose of avoiding the “Afro-centrism” of Critical Race Theory, its initial tendency to
focus on black racial issues instead of issues of other races and other oppressed peoples. Phillips
discusses the initial reluctance of the Critical Race Theory Workshop to accept principles that the
fight against the oppression of gays is important, and the “excruciatingly long time [it took] for
the…Workshop to reflect a strong stance against heterosexism.”196 The seventh point of the
Workshop’s “Tenets of Critical Race Theory,” first discussed in the second workshop, stated an
embracement of the “larger project of liberating all oppressed people.”197 The issue for many
was “whether gay men and lesbians are ‘oppressed people,’ and if so, whether their liberation
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had anything to do with the fight against racial oppression.”198 It took eight years after the
second conference when the seventh point was introduced for the Workshop to fully embrace
principles that the fight against the oppression of gays and lesbians is important and that it should
be “an integral part of the antiracist struggle.”199 Phillips states that Critical Race Theory
Workshops now understand that “racism is inextricably linked to oppression on the bases of
gender and sexuality.”200
An important issue also discussed in Latino Critical Legal Theory is the notion of a
“black/white” civil rights model, the idea that the United States civil rights model is based
overwhelmingly on race and thus favors black minorities. Moran discusses how the legacy of a
“Black-White model” of race relations helps to account for the limited success of Latinos and
non-blacks as well as other oppressed groups in achieving civil rights.201 The Civil Rights model
is rooted in the African-American experience as a reaction to the harmful effects of slavery,
whereas the Latino and non-blacks are considered “white immigrants” who were not subject to
slavery and thus are ineligible for some of the same civil rights that blacks have achieved.
“White” immigrants were often expected to assimilate by learning English and adopting
particular American customs in order to prevent discrimination; “officials doubted that Latinos
were entitled to civil rights protections because like earlier generations of White immigrants,
they could achieve inclusion through acculturation and assimilation.”202 Many groups argued that
“a history of disadvantage and discrimination rendered them sufficiently like Blacks to merit
special protection”203 under civil rights laws. It is this almost-forced comparison to the black
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experience of slavery in America to determine if groups are eligible for the civil rights model
that delays many oppressed groups from achieving civil rights; almost no experience of any
group in American history is comparable to the experience of slavery. In a way, the level or
severity of past oppression determines the eligibility of oppressed groups to be considered for
civil rights protection under the Black-White civil rights model. Moran argues that “Latinos need
to build coalitions with other civil rights groups to forge effective reforms.”204 She also states
that “some Latinos have questioned the normative centrality of race under the civil rights model.
They have insisted on treating race as one of a number of relevant personal characteristics that
shape opportunity.”205
A similar discussion of the black/white binary can be found in the writing of Juan Perea,
who explores several leading works on race to show that the black/white paradigm of race not
only exists in American legal culture and society, but that it limits racial discourse and operates
to exclude Latinos/as and other non-black minorities from full membership in society.206 He
defines the race paradigm as “the conception that race in America consists, either exclusively or
primarily, of only two constituent racial groups, the white and the black.”207 When race scholars
speak or write as though the black and white races are the only races that matter for the purposes
of discussion of racial issues and solutions, they invoke this paradigm into racial discourse.
Furthermore, when scholars merely acknowledge the existence of other races within a discourse
that mainly focuses on the white and black races, they also invoke this paradigm because they
fail to examine the distinct “voices”, “histories”, and “real presence”208 of these other races. By
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examining these other races, like Latinos/as, Asian-Americans, Native Americans, and others
through an analogy to the black and white races or “real” races, argues, Perea argues, scholars
restate the black/white paradigm of race.
Victor Romero also explores the interconnections between race and sexual orientation in
the context of binational same-sex marriages and the United States Supreme Court.209 He finds
that although there are many similarities between the Lovings and same-sex couples today and
progress has been made in the form of Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, a more recent
Supreme Court decision, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,210 may have
less positive consequences for the gay rights and same-sex marriage movements. This recent
case, he argues, “should give gay rights advocates pause, suggesting that race and sexual
orientation may be doomed to follow separate, and hardly ever analogous, paths.”211
The overall position of Latino Critical Legal theory appears supportive of using race and
sexual orientation together to fight discrimination and to advance civil rights if the black/white
binary can be bypassed. The arguments show numerous interconnections between various
oppressed identities and that by working together, these different oppressed groups could more
easily achieve civil rights for all. The difficulty, of course, is getting past this Black/White model
of civil rights discourse that currently restricts the ability of non-black and non-racial minorities
in achieving civil rights.
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Schacter advances the scholarship on the black/white paradigm by fully extending it into
the gay rights debates.212 She argues that because the “African American experience…represents
the paradigm for thinking about American civil rights law,”213 what Schacter calls the “Discourse
of Equivalents” is used by opponents of gay rights to force a comparison of the experience of
gays and lesbians with the experience of African Americans in order to legitimize civil rights for
gays. Schacter argues that the Discourse of Equivalents invokes two main themes: the gay and
lesbian experience as insufficiently like the experience of already-protected groups like racial
minorities, women, and religious groups; and sexual orientation as an aspect of identity is
insufficiently like other already-protected aspects of identity like race, gender, religion, and
national origin. Both themes form the argument by gay rights opponents that because of the
differences between gays and blacks in their historical experience of oppression and their type of
identity, gays and lesbians do not qualify for the protection of civil rights laws.
Schacter argues that our civil rights discourse should not be based on sameness. In other
words, in order to be eligible for civil rights, a particular group’s experience should not need to
be the same or even similar to another group’s experience. In doing so, says Schacter, we enter
into an “oppression contest,” which leads us to accept “the idea that there is only so much
freedom to go around and that socially oppressed groups must fight over these putative
spoils.”214 Schacter devises a more appropriate test of the legitimacy of a particular group’s civil
rights claim. To determine if the extent to which a group has been oppressed merits civil rights
protection, we must first look to the specific experiences of gays and lesbians, and then consider
whether “social subordination and stigmatization subject gay men and lesbians…to systematic
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exclusion and disadvantage at the hands of dominant groups.”215 Schacter describes this test as a
higher level of generality than a mere comparison of historical levels of oppression.
Hutchinson discusses the multidimensionality of oppression and argues for more
discussion of race within the dialogue of gay and lesbian legal theory.216 “Racial, class, and
sexual subordination are interrelated” he writes. But responses to sexual subordination tend to
focus on gays and lesbians of privileged race and class (white and well-off as opposed to nonwhite and poor), and “consequently, gay and lesbian legal theory and political discourse fail to
reflect the complexity of gay and lesbian experiences and exclude people of color and the poor
from equality debates.”217 Hutchinson also argues that analogies between racial minorities and
gays and their struggles to achieve civil rights portrays racial minorities and gays as two separate
groups, while ignoring and making invisible those who do not fit into either group, such
individuals who are black and gay. This analogy, he argues, masks the importance of the
multidimensionality of oppression.
Hutchinson shows that for gays, even trying to win the “oppression contest” is futile, and
that they should steer away from this discourse. He cites Andrew Sullivan, who argues that the
intensity of oppression against gays and lesbians is actually more severe than slavery because,
although gays and lesbians have never been enslaved, slaves “were occasionally allowed the
right to marry…[but] because [homosexuals] haven’t even been deemed eligible for the
institution of marriage in the first place[,] they have always been, from one particular
perspective, beneath slaves. And they still are.”218 This argument, Hutchinson writes, “distorts”
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the brutality of slavery, and ignores the severely limited rights of slave marriages. And by
comparing gay and lesbian oppression to slavery and asserting that it is more severe, Sullivan
only reinforces slavery as the most severe form of oppression and reinforces blacks as most
deserving of civil rights protection. Hutchinson attempts to advance a new discourse for gay and
lesbian civil rights claims:
Gay and lesbian legal theorists and political activists should advocate sexual equality by addressing the
many harms sexual subordination causes. These harms require legal and political remedies for their own
sake—without reference to the rights and injuries of black heterosexuals…Multidimensionality provides a
more effective framework for discussing these harms…[It] portrays these harms without diminishing—but
rather, acknowledging and emphasizing—the importance of race and other sources of empowerment and
disempowerment.219

This new discourse asserts that gay and lesbian civil rights activists should refrain from
comparing their civil rights experience with that of blacks; instead, they must focus on the many
individual harms that are specific to gays and lesbians. An inclusion of specific racial
discrimination suffered by gay racial minorities will help to advance this discourse without
forcing a comparison. We will gain a greater understanding of how racism affects gays and
lesbians and how heterosexism affects gays and lesbians, and we avoid the harms imposed by
comparing forms of oppression between varying minority groups. After an examination of the
plaintiffs’ briefs in Goodridge and Kerrigan, I will show how Hutchinson’s new discourse of
civil rights fits well with Schacter’s new legitimacy test for gay and lesbian civil rights, and that
the evolution of race-based arguments as applied to same-sex marriage from the Goodridge brief
to the Kerrigan brief nicely reflects both Hutchinson’s and Schacter’s arguments.

D. The Importance of Case Briefs
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The existing scholarly literature on this topic provides little examination of the Loving
analogy as a strategy of lawyers in modern same-sex marriage cases, and no examination of
briefs submitted in these cases. A look at these briefs would show how LGBT activists have used
the racial interpretation of the Equal Protection and Due Processes clauses in Loving as a strategy
in same-sex marriage cases, and that is how I intend to contribute to the scholarly literature. By
looking at the relationship between race and sexual orientation through the lens of case briefs
and state court opinions dealing with same-sex marriage, we would achieve a greater
understanding of whether the use of Loving as a strategy in same-sex marriage cases is wise and
beneficial.
But why examine case briefs? If the existing scholarship failed to look at briefs on this
particular topic, does that not suggest that briefs are trivial and that nothing of significant value
can be gained from them? To the contrary, rather; briefs are an extremely important element of
court proceedings, and an examination of briefs provides perhaps the best picture of how
activists employ certain arguments in litigation. I believe that the existing scholarship has erred
in its failure to study briefs in same-sex marriage litigation.
Professor Laura Hatcher has argued that amicus briefs have played important roles in
various court cases. Her discussion is reflective of the role of briefs in the litigation strategy of
the Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), a non-profit legal advocacy
organization, in same-sex marriage cases.220 She discusses the emergence of several nonprofit
law firms devoted to conservative causes, including the Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), and
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notes that the amicus brief is its “primary litigation strategy.”221 Additionally, the PLF “claims its
work has impacted many areas of law…[and its] litigation activity has expanded well beyond its
initial narrow scope.”222 There are now many conservative legal interest groups223 that sumbit
amicus briefs in cases around the country as the primary litigation strategy to advance their
causes. Hatcher also writes of the importance of examining briefs, because “amicus briefs as well
as case law have provided insights into the workings of property rights advocacy and changes
occurring in U.S. constitutional law.”224
And the importance of the appellant briefs in various types of litigation has been
expressed by many, including Carol C. Berry, Judge Herbert C. Goodrich, and Supreme Court
Justice Thurgood Marshall. The importance of appellant briefs is relevant to my thesis because I
will look at GLAD’s appellant briefs in two state supreme court cases. Berry describes the brief
as “the most important component of a successful appeal. It gives the judges the first and, many
times, the last impression of the merits of the case.”225 Berry argues that the brief has grown
more significant throughout the years because of the changing nature of our legal system. Oral
arguments are now much shorter than they were in the past, and many circuit courts now only
hear oral arguments in exceptional In fact, “[the brief] may be the only vehicle by which the
advocate presents his or her argument.”226 The quality of the brief also often determines whether
oral argument is justified and will be allowed.
Judge Herbert C. Goodrich views the importance of briefs similarly:
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It is hard to overstate the importance of the brief on an appeal. Oral argument will be discussed later. It is
important too. But it is made only once in nearly all instances and it is inevitable that some of its effect will
be lost in the interval between the time the argument is made and the court opinion appears. But the brief
speaks from the time it is filed and continues through oral argument, conference, and opinion writing.
Sometimes a brief will be read and reread, no one knows how many times except the judge and his law
clerk.227

Judge Goodrich here alluded to the often long interval between oral arguments and the writing
and release of the opinion, which Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall noted directly:
Regardless of the panel you get, the questions you get, or the answers you give, I maintain it is the brief
that does the final job, if for no other reason than that the opinions are often written several weeks and
sometimes months after the argument. The arguments, great as they may have been are forgotten. In the
seclusion of his chambers the judge has only his briefs and the law books. At that time your brief is your
only spokesman.228

Considering prominent judges like Judge Goodrich and Justice Marshall view the brief as the
most important instrument for advocates in appeals, it is strange that scholars have neglected the
brief in the literature dealing with race and same-sex marriage litigation. By exploring racial
arguments as used in briefs as the central element of this project, I believe am contributing to,
expanding, and even improving the existing scholarship in a significant way.

E. Methodology

I argue that although cases like Loving or Perez may be an appropriate legal model for
same-sex marriage litigation, a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection is not the
best strategy for such litigation because it actually imposes certain limits on the same-sex
marriage movement. To explore this argument, I will examine the appellant briefs submitted
with two recent state court opinions by GLAD, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, and
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health. I have chosen to look at these two cases because
227
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they are two of only three states where same-sex marriage is currently legal as a result of state
court decisions, and time constraints and the scope of this project prevented an examination of all
three. Goodridge was decided in 2003, Kerrigan was decided in 2008, and Varnum v. Brien was
decided in 2009. I felt the two older cases would represent the most original uses of a racial
approach to same-sex marriage, as it is possible that Varnum, with two recent state court
opinions as precedent, borrowed heavily from the arguments used in Goodridge and Kerrigan.
More time certainly would have allowed me to look at Varnum as well, and I certainly suggest
that any scholar looking to expand upon my work take a look at Varnum as it would definitely
add to our understanding of the evolution of this racial interpretation in same-sex marriage cases.
In looking at Goodridge and Kerrigan, I will first introduce the case and set the context
by explaining the facts of the case. I will then look at each way a racial interpretation of due
process and equal protection has been used by GLAD through three different aspects of the brief:
the due process claims, the equal protection claims, and the treatment of the definitional
argument against same-sex marriage. I will note each way the plaintiffs use a racial argument,
and highlight those arguments I think are most important and most demonstrative of the
problems of using a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection as applied to samesex marriage litigation. In Goodridge, I highlight four specific racial arguments in the brief that
demonstrate the limits of a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection as applied to
same-sex marriage litigation. In Kerrigan, I highlight six racial arguments that demonstrate these
limits. In the concluding chapter, I compare my findings in both briefs to show an evolution of
the use of these racial arguments from Goodridge to Kerrigan. I find that the racial arguments in
both briefs show that by moving away from race, same-sex marriage advocates can bypass the
dangers and limitations imposed by the black/white binary more easily and make a stronger
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argument for same-sex marriage. While certain racial arguments in both briefs could be
improved, including the treatment of the definitional argument by employing the scholarship of
Professor Eskridge, certain arguments demonstrate that GLAD may have learned to move away
from race in the time between the two cases. Notably, the different treatment given to the history
of oppression suffered by racial minorities and the LGBT community in each brief signals this
shift.
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III.

THE MASSACHUSETTS CASE: GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC HEALTH (2003)

We declare that barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely
because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.229

Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (2003) provides the first example of this
project. An examination of the Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants reveals how the plaintiffs used a
racial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
in this case. The plaintiffs’ use of race throughout the brief shows that although the racial
interpretation may provide a logical legal model for same-sex marriage claims, certain aspects of
that racial interpretation impose limits on same-sex marriage litigation. The plaintiffs’ use of race
throughout the brief also reflects various same-sex marriage scholarship discussed in chapter II.
The plaintiffs employed a racial interpretation of equal protection and due process
arguments and rely on Loving v. Virginia heavily in the brief. In arguing that same-sex couples
should be allowed to marry and that a prohibition on same-sex marriage violates both individual
liberty interests and equality interests, the plaintiffs used Loving to argue that marriage is a
fundamental right for all people, and that it applies to same-sex couples just as it does to mixedrace couples. Loving was also used to support the Equal Protection argument. Just as prohibitions
on mixed-race marriage were found to be an unconstitutional racial discrimination because they
violated Equal Protection guarantees, the plaintiffs argued, prohibitions on same-sex marriage
should be ruled unconstitutional based on equal protection grounds because they constituted sex
or sexual orientation discrimination. Calling the “analogy to Perez and Loving…logically and
analytically irrefutable,” the plaintiffs attempted to show that the mode of analysis relied upon in
Loving was the same mode of analysis present in Goodridge. Although much of the plaintiffs’
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racial interpretation of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses as applied to the same-sex
marriage debates was indeed logical and legitimate, I find four major aspects of the brief that
suggest that a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection is not the best strategy and
that, in fact, same-sex marriage advocates should avoid race as much as possible. The first
important aspect of the brief that I highlight shows the plaintiffs avoiding the issue of race, and
reflects the third major perspective of the scholarly literature discussed in chapter II. This
perspective, again, consists of Critical Race theorists, Latino Critical Legal theorists, and Queer
theorists who have found limitations imposed on the same-sex marriage and gay rights
movements by the use of a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection to advance
same-sex marriage. Meanwhile, the other three major aspects I highlight show that the plaintiffs
still need to take caution in how they approach a racial interpretation to same-sex marriage to
avoid the problematic impacts of the black/white binary. These three aspects reflect a different
perspective of the scholarship discussed in chapter II, the argument that a racial interpretation of
due process and equal protection is a legitimate and logical legal model for same-sex marriage
litigation, and should be used as part of an argument to advance same-sex marriage. Overall, I
find that the Goodridge brief represents the view in the literature that a racial interpretation
should be used to advance same-sex marriage; most of the racial elements of the brief fail to
address the limitations imposed by applying these racial interpretations to same-sex marriage
litigation.
To frame my examination of the racial analysis used in the brief in the context of the
procedural history and rulings of the case, I first provide a summary of the facts of the case. I
then explore each way that race is used throughout the brief, and highlight the four most
significant aspects of the racial interpretation as they arise. I analyze each racial interpretation for
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its applicability to same-sex marriage litigation, its effectiveness in advancing pro-same-sex
marriage legalization arguments, and its treatment by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
in the opinion. I have organized my approach to focus on three main aspects of the brief: the Due
Process claims, the Equal Protection claims, and claims against the traditional definition of
marriage argument.

A. Facts of the Case
Seven couples sought to obtain marriage licenses from a city or town clerk’s office in the
state of Massachusetts in March or April of 2001. Each couple’s application for a marriage
license was rejected because each couple consisted of two people of the same sex, and
Massachusetts did not recognize same-sex marriage.
On April 11, 2001, the seven couples, represented by the Gay and Lesbians Advocates
and Defenders (GLAD) filed suit in Superior Court, seeking a judgment that the state’s practice
of denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated several articles, including the liberty,
freedom, equality, and due process provisions of the Massachusetts constitution. The defendant,
the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, represented by the Attorney General, admitted
its practice of denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples, but argued that this practice did
not violate any Massachusetts law and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief. A
Superior Court judge ruled in favor of the state, finding that the plain wording of the text of the
Massachusetts constitution could not be construed as recognizing same-sex marriage, that the
state’s practice of denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples did not violate the liberty,
freedom, equality, or due process provisions of the Massachusetts constitution, that the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights did not guarantee a fundamental right to marry a person of
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the same sex, and that the state’s prohibition of same-sex marriage rationally furthered the state’s
legitimate interest in safeguarding procreation.
The plaintiffs appealed the ruling of the Superior Court, and the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court granted direct appellate review. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,
declaring that the state may not “deny the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil
marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish to marry”230 and that the state had “failed
to identify any constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-sex
couples.”231 The Court held that the state did not have a rational basis to deny marriage licenses
to same-sex couples on the grounds of equal protection and due process.

B. A Racial Analysis
What follows is an analysis of the racial arguments used in the brief. I have organized
this analysis into three sections: due process, equal protection, and the definitional argument.
Within each section, I analysis the use of racial precedent and analogies in the context of the
broader constitutional or definitional claim.

i.

Fundamental Right

The plaintiffs, represented on the brief by GLAD, argued that there was a fundamental
right to marriage enshrined in the constitution, and that the “Application of the Marriage Laws
by the Defendants Directly and Substantially Burdens the Plaintiffs’ Rights to Marry.”232 GLAD
argued that alleged state interests in biological procreation, childbearing, and the conservation of
resources carried no weight here, that the needs of gays for self-determination and family privacy
230
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were the same as non-gays, and that “doomsday speculation” about polygamy was unfounded. In
using Loving, GLAD wrote that “It is beyond question that the right to marry is fundamental, and
within the rights of liberty and privacy, and as such, may not be abridged by the state without a
compelling state interest.”233
GLAD then showed that this fundamental right to marry extended to all, citing Zablocki:
“Although Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of
this Court confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”234
They cited Turner v. Safley,235 in which marriage rights were extended to prisoners, as an
example. In an attempt to understand the liberty and privacy underpinnings” of Loving and
Turner, the plaintiffs detailed the history of cases before Loving that placed the right “to marry”
as a liberty interest “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” These cases,
including Meyer, Perez, Skinner, and Pierce, established that “‘the right to join in marriage with
the person of one’s choice’ is at least as protected as the liberty rights to have offspring or send
one’s child to a particular school.”236 To the plaintiffs, it was
clear why the California Supreme Court struck its miscegenation law in 1948 under the 14th Amendment
even though miscegenation laws were commonplace at the time, no court had ever declared a
miscegenation law unconstitutional, such laws were popular, and Plessy v. Ferguson was still the law of the
land.237

Because the “Constitution protects against unwarranted state interference with ‘personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education,’”238 GLAD stated that “the right to marry without the freedom to marry the person of
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one’s choice is no right at all”239 and that state intrusion into these areas of personal decision
imposed an “intolerable indignity” on an individual. There are human values at stake in these
personal decisions that protect the family, argued GLAD, and court opinions showed that we
cannot restrict these human values to a traditional “nuclear” family.240
It is here that I would like to highlight my first major finding in GLAD’s application of a
racial interpretation to same-sex marriage litigation, that GLAD attempted to move away from
race in its brief. GLAD admitted that “Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination,” and,
to justify the applicability of a racial discrimination case to a sexual orientation/gender
discrimination case, argued that “prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the
right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.” GLAD cited decisions like
Zablocki and Turner to show that Loving was still powerful precedent for same-sex marriage
cases because its relevance to marriage was equal to its relevance to racial discrimination. I find
that GLAD actually moved away from race in this instance by citing cases like Turner. The fact
that GLAD admitted Loving was a racial case may not seem a wise argument, given the popular
argument of same-sex marriage opponents that the traditional definition of marriage is the union
of a man and a woman. After all, if Loving is more about race than it is about marriage, it is
easier to argue that it does not apply to same-sex marriage litigation because it recognized the
right of people to marry another person regardless of race, but did not recognize a change in the
institution of marriage.241 But by citing additional like Turner to show that this fundamental right

239

Ibid.
Ibid., 28
241
In Justice Cordy’s dissent, he argues that the majority erroneously assumes that the definition of marriage
includes two people of the same sex. The plaintiffs’ argument that there is a fundamental right to marry a person of
the same sex is grounded in several cases, including Turner, Zablocki, Loving, Griswold, and Skinner, and Justice
Cordy explains why none of these cases establish a fundamental right to marry a person of the same sex. These
cases, he argues, deal with the “‘fundamental’ nature of the institution of marriage as it has existed and been
understood in this country, not as the court has redefined it today” (at 116). He argues that the fundamental right to
marriage in these cases is based on the interest of each individual in procreation: “in Loving v. Virginia…the Court
240

69

to marry extended to prisoners and people other than racial minorities, GLAD attempted to show
that it is the central holding about marriage in Loving that matters and applies to same-sex
marriage litigation. Other cases applied the general right to marry on specific disadvantaged
groups, therefore Loving does apply to same-sex marriage litigation because Loving applied the
general right to marry to interracial couples. Because GLAD made Loving more about marriage
than about race, it actually moved away from the issue of race to advance it argument about
same-sex marriage.
The Massachusetts Court’s opinion invoked Loving to help establish marriage as a
fundamental right. “Civil marriage has long been termed a ‘civil right,’” the court wrote, and
cited from Loving: “The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”242 Here, the Court used Loving
in the same way as the plaintiffs; it recognized the plaintiffs’ argument in the brief that Loving
helped to establish marriage as a fundamental right. The court rejected the state’s argument that
this case dealt with the rights of couples, instead arguing that it dealt with the rights of
individuals. “The rights implicated in this case are at the core of individual privacy and
autonomy,”243 the court wrote. Another passage from Loving was cited: “Under our Constitution,
the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and
cannot be infringed by the State.”244
The court also invoked Loving and Perez to reflect upon the long history of antimiscegenation laws and to show that the right to marry must include the right to marry someone
implicitly linked marriage with procreation in describing marriage as ‘fundamental to our very existence’” (at 117,
citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, at 12). This allows him to conclude that “because same-sex couples are unable
to procreate on their own, any right to marriage they may possess cannot be based on their interest in procreation,
which has been essential to the Supreme Court's denomination of the right to marry as fundamental” (at 118).
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of one’s choice. The Court then compared the interracial marriage cases with the same-sex
marriage case:
In this case, as in Perez and Loving, a statute deprives individuals of access to an institution of fundamental
legal, personal, and social significance -- the institution of marriage -- because of a single trait: skin color in
Perez and Loving, sexual orientation here. As it did in Perez and Loving, history must yield to a more fully
developed understanding of the invidious quality of the discrimination.245

Because “history” yielded to a better understanding of negative qualities of discrimination in
Perez and Loving regarding interracial marriage, argued the Court, here the opponents of samesex marriage must yield to a better understanding of discrimination suffered by same-sex couples
in their inability to legally marry. The Court also made the point that individuals are deprived of
a fundamental right because of only one trait in both cases, and that that is a fundamental point
of comparison between the interracial marriage cases and the same-sex marriage case. Rather
than follow the plaintiffs’ route in citing several cases that extend that the distinction of marriage
in Loving as a fundamental right to all people and not just racial minorities, the court focused on
the individual choice aspect of marriage. For the court, it is the necessity that marriage be an
individual choice (the right to choose to marry) which justified the applicability of Loving, a
racial discrimination case, to same-sex marriage litigation. The plaintiffs did use this as an
important part of their argument, but the court chose to make this central and more important
than the plaintiffs’ reliance on several other cases to counter the argument that Loving is not
applicable because it arose in the context of racial discrimination. This is not to say the court
completely ignored the plaintiffs’ citation of cases like Turner and Zablocki, however. Citing
United States v. Virginia,246 the Goodridge court called “the history of constitutional law…‘the
story of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or
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excluded.’”247 These extensions also applied in the area of civil marriage, the court wrote, and
were demonstrated by decisions in Turner, Loving, and Perez. The court summarized the many
changes to marriage over the years: “As a public institution and a right of fundamental
importance, civil marriage is an evolving paradigm.”248 The court simply chose not to use this
argument as the main factor in its Due Process argument.
The Goodridge court discussed the Department of Public Health’s argument that the
“Loving decision did not profoundly alter the by-then common conception of marriage because it
was decided at a time when antimiscegenation statutes were in ‘full-scale retreat.’”249 The
plaintiffs had countered this argument by highlighting the importance of Perez, and noting that it
was decided “even though miscegenation laws were commonplace at the time, no court had ever
declared a miscegenation law unconstitutional, such laws were popular, and Plessy v. Ferguson
was still the law of the land.” The court found that the Department’s argument ignored Perez, a
successful constitutional challenge to an anti-miscegenation statute decided nineteen years
earlier, and a precursor to Loving. The court described the racial situation in 1948: “racial
inequality was rampant and normative, segregation in public and private institutions was
commonplace, the civil rights movement had not yet been launched, and the ‘separate but equal’
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson was still good law.”250 An anti-miscegenation attitude did not
deter the Supreme Court of California in Perez from declaring anti-miscegenation laws
unconstitutional. By distinguishing Perez, the Goodridge court showed here that although Loving
may have been decided at a time when most anti-miscegenation statues had already been
repealed, Perez (which accomplished essentially the same thing as Loving but on a smaller scale)
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was decided when most states did still legally prohibit interracial marriage and when racism and
segregation were much more common.251 The Department of Public Health tried to make this
argument to show that Loving was not appropriate precedent for the legalization of same-sex
marriage, because directly prior to the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling in Goodridge, no
state legally allowed same-sex marriage. But a look at Perez shows that that was one of the first
steps toward Loving, and at the time of Perez miscegenation was widely rejected by most states
and the general public.
A second major finding I make is also a major problem with the racial
interpretation of Due Process applied to same-sex marriage which GLAD failed to address. A
common argument made by same-sex marriage opponents is that Loving is not applicable to
same-sex marriage litigation because while Loving was decided after most states recognized
interracial marriages, very few states currently recognize (and at the time of Goodridge, no states
recognized) same-sex marriage.252 GLAD attempted to counter this argument by citing Perez,
which was decided several years earlier when many states still had prohibitions against
interracial marriage. GLAD argued that because of the long line of precedent recognizing the
right to marry a person of one’s choice, it was clear why the Perez court ruled against antimiscegenation laws “even though miscegenation laws were commonplace at the time, no court
had ever declared a miscegenation law unconstitutional, such laws were popular, and Plessy v.
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Ferguson was still the law of the land.”253 However, there are clear differences between Perez
and Goodridge to be easily exploited by same-sex marriage opponents. Perez was the first court
to strike down anti-miscegenation laws, so in that respect it is more applicable to Goodridge than
is Loving. But when Perez was decided, several states (mostly northern states) legally recognized
interracial marriage and had already lifted their bans through the legislature. At the time of
Goodridge, no state recognized same-sex marriage, although the Hawaii state supreme court was
the only other court to rule bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. This difference poses
two challenges. First, it disputes the notion that the circumstances around Perez were similar to
the circumstances around Goodridge in that they were (or would be, in the case of Goodridge)
both the first states to recognize interracial and same-sex marriage, respectively. Second, it gives
ammunition to opponents of same-sex marriage who argue that marriage for those of the same
sex should be legalized through legislative, “democratic” means rather than through the courts. If
many states accomplished the legal recognition of interracial marriage through the legislature,
then the same can and should apply in the case of same-sex marriage. The court accepted the
GLAD’s argument, and restated it almost verbatim in its opinion. However, the court also did not
take into account the major differences between Perez and Goodridge.
ii.

Equal Protection

GLAD, in the Goodridge brief, also used a racial interpretation of Equal Protection to
argue that constitutional equality guarantees are violated by restricting same-sex couples from
marrying. They used an analogy to Loving and Perez to reject the equal application argument of
the defendants; the following excerpt from the brief illustrates this argument:
An examination of Perez v. Sharp and Loving v. Virginia demonstrates that “sex” is the forbidden
variable by which the defendants administer the marriage laws. The facile defense offered by the
defendants is that men and women are equally disadvantaged, since neither can marry someone of the same
253
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sex, so there is no discrimination here. In both Perez and Loving, the courts rejected the notion that
miscegenation laws effected no racial discrimination simply because both whites and persons of color were
equally disabled from marrying each other. Equal application of the law to whites and blacks did not
eradicate the racial classification at work even though on a group level, there was symmetry in the options
of white and black persons.
Critically, rather than comparing the experience of whites and persons of color as groups, the
courts found that limiting an individual’s choice of whom he or she could marry based on the individuals’
races was racial discrimination forbidden by the 14th Amendment.
Just as those courts had no problem detecting a racial classification at work, so is there a sex-based
classification here. The analogy to Perez and Loving is logically and analytically irrefutable.254

Table 1 shows charts used in the brief to justify the analogy described above between the
interracial marriage cases and the same-sex marriage case. Essentially, the equal protection
argument presented in GLAD’s brief required us to analyze marriage rights as applied not to
groups, but to individuals; because Loving viewed these rights as applied to individuals and
found an unconstitutional discrimination based on race, this brief argued that marriage rights
should again be analyzed as applied to individuals and that this analysis uncovered an
unconstitutional discrimination based on sex.
GLAD also used a racial interpretation of equal protection to reject the opinion of the
trial court and the defendants’ argument that the classification at issue here was between couples,
specifically same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and not between individuals, and therefore
constitutional. GLAD relied upon McLaughlin v. Florida, in which a criminal statute that
prohibited unmarried interracial couples from living together or “habitually occupy[ing] the
same room at night”255 while imposing no penalty for similarly situated same-race couples was
ruled unconstitutional. GLAD wrote:
The ability to identify a racial classification when the statute “treats the interracial couple made up of a
white person and a Negro differently than it does any other couple”, is no different from the ability to
identify a sex-based classification when a statute is applied to treat a couple made up of a man and a man
differently from a couple made up of a woman and a man.256
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GLAD concluded that there was a sex-based classification under Article I of the Massachusetts
constitution. This reliance upon McLaughlin makes sense, but I think that GLAD should have
noted additional non-racial cases to support its argument. It is too easy to argue that McLaughlin
should not apply because it was a racial case that did not even involve marriage. GLAD should
focus its argument on highlighting unequal treatment as the central issue in McLaughlin and then
showing how the central principle of unequal treatment applied to interracial couples living
together. As it did in its due process argument when it cited other cases that first found a general
right to marry and then applied that general right to many different groups of people and not just
based on race, GLAD here should note cases that first found a general violation of unequal
treatment, and then show how that unequal treatment was found to apply to particular groups,
again, not based solely on race.
In arguing that sexual orientation was a suspect class under the Massachusetts
constitution and that therefore sexual orientation-based restrictions were subject to strict scrutiny,
GLAD used race to show that gays and lesbians shared the same characteristics as other groups
considered to be suspect classes: “gay people share a history of persecution comparable to that
of blacks and women and that [o]utside of racial and religious minorities, ... no group ... has
suffered such pernicious and sustained hostility.”257 GLAD called the persecution suffered by
gays and lesbians “comparable” to that suffered by blacks, but also conceded that the persecution
suffered by gays and lesbians was perhaps not as severe as that suffered by blacks.
The historical comparison of oppression between racial minorities and sexual minorities
is the third aspect of the brief I will highlight. I find this to be the second major, and perhaps the
most consequential, problem in GLAD’s brief. By bringing up and admitting the difference in
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the histories of these two minority groups, GLAD highlighted the debate over the level of
severity of oppression suffered by various civil rights groups. I find that it is quite difficult to
argue, which GLAD did not attempt, that the discrimination and oppression suffered by the
LGBT community or any other group is worse the slavery suffered by blacks. The Black/White
Binary paradigm of the American Civil Rights movement, as discussed by various scholars,258
holds that the level of severity of oppression determines the extent to which a particular minority
or oppressed group is eligible for civil rights. Because blacks suffered most severely, they are
granted civil rights for which other groups, like Asian-Americans, Latinos, or the LGBT
community may not be deemed eligible. GLAD argued that the oppression suffered by blacks
and the LGBT community is “comparable,” contrary to what many same-sex marriage opponents
argue, and thus concluded that the history of these two groups is not so different that it is
impossible to compare. But GLAD conceded that oppression suffered by blacks was more
severe, which, under the Black/White civil rights model, invites a comparison and rebuke that
therefore gays and lesbians may not be eligible for certain civil rights, like the choice of
marriage, that racial minorities were deemed eligible for. A stronger argument by GLAD is
desperately needed. GLAD’s argument here can best be seen in Justice Greavey’s concurring
opinion, in which he wrote:
The equal protection infirmity at work here is strikingly similar to (although, perhaps, more subtle than) the
invidious discrimination perpetuated by Virginia's antimiscegenation laws and unveiled in the decision of
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Loving v. Virginia, supra…. That our marriage laws, unlike antimiscegenation laws, were not enacted
purposely to discriminate in no way neutralizes their present discriminatory character.259

However, the majority opinion of the court failed to mention any comparison between the
distinct histories and levels of oppression suffered by blacks and the LGBT community; this
could indicate the court believes that either this issue bears no relevance to the case, or so much
as mentioning it would detract from the argument and keeping silent about it would be best. In
any case, GLAD should stay away from a historical comparison between racial oppression and
sexual oppression.

iii.

Definitional Argument

GLAD again used a racial analysis to counter the definitional argument that marriage
should not be extended to same-sex marriage because the traditional definition of marriage is a
union between a man and a woman. A passage from Jones v. Hallahan illustrates the definitional
argument: “[A]ppellants are prevented from marrying ... by their own incapability of entering
into a marriage as that term is defined.”260 GLAD again employed the Supreme Court’s decision
in Loving, this time to argue against the definitional argument. Recent courts like the Warren
Court in its Loving decision rejected this reasoning as “circular and unpersuasive,” argued
GLAD, because “it fails to address whether the prohibition itself is discriminatory and
constitutionally permissible.”261 Loving found this reasoning circular and unpersuasive by
rejecting the “idea that a marriage between a white person and person of color was not a true
marriage.”262
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This use of a racial analysis to counter the definitional argument against same-sex
marriage appears mostly successful, as the court rejected the reliance on the traditional definition
of marriage to oppose same-sex marriage. However, the majority opinion by Justice Marshall did
not fully incorporate the GLAD’s racial analysis of the definitional argument. The court admitted
that the decision “marks a significant change in the definition of marriage as it has been inherited
from the common law, and understood by many societies for centuries.”263 But the court did not
reject this reasoning as circular and unpersuasive. Rather, the court appealed to the possible
effects of the legalization of same-sex marriage on ‘traditional’ opposite-sex marriage, which, it
concluded, were not negative. The plaintiffs sought to be married, but they did not seek to
“undermine the institution of civil marriage.”264 Legalizing same-sex marriage may change the
traditional definition of marriage, “but it does not disturb the fundamental value of marriage in
our society.”265 The court did use a racial analogy in its decision, but it was quite different than
that used in Loving and, subsequently, by GLAD in the brief: “Recognizing the right of an
individual to marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity of oppositesex marriage, any more than recognizing the right of an individual to marry a person of a
different race devalues the marriage of a person who marries someone of her own race.”266
GLAD’s argument, which cited Loving’s rejection of the traditional definition argument
as circular and unpersuasive, was actually better seen in Justice Greaney’s concurring opinion
than in the majority opinion:
To define the institution of marriage by the characteristics of those to whom it always has been accessible,
in order to justify the exclusion of those to whom it never has been accessible, is conclusory and bypasses
the core question we are asked to decide. This case calls for a higher level of legal analysis. Precisely, the
case requires that we confront ingrained assumptions with respect to historically accepted roles of men and
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women within the institution of marriage and requires that we reexamine these assumptions… to ensure
that the governmental conduct challenged here conforms to the supreme charter of our Commonwealth.267

Furthermore, argued Justice Greaney, justification of the prohibition of same-sex marriage
through this definitional argument and an accusation that the plaintiffs are trying to change the
institution of marriage “terminates the debate at the outset without any accompanying reasoned
analysis.”268 It is clear that Justice Greaney’s concurrence more closely parallels the argument in
Loving than does the majority opinion and GLAD’s argument in the brief. In the same way that
Loving rejected the definitional argument because it was circular and unpersuasive as applied to
the interracial marriage debate, here the definitional argument was rejected by GLAD and Justice
Greaney as circular and unpersuasive as applied to the same-sex marriage debate.
GLAD’s treatment of the definitional argument is the fourth aspect of the brief I would
like to highlight, and the third major problem I find with the racial analysis used in the brief. The
fact that the court used a different approach to reject the definitional argument perhaps illustrated
its recognition of the problematic aspect of the GLAD’s treatment of this argument. I suggest hat
GLAD use a different approach, that of Professor Eskridge, who argues that there really is no
‘traditional’ definition of marriage as a union of a man and a woman. GLAD should have
detailed the history of marriage as Professor Eskridge does, and showed that marriage has not
always, in every case and society, been considered an exclusively opposite-sex institution. I do
not think that this argument should replace the argument GLAD used in the brief. Rather,
Professor Eskridge’s historical debate should compliment GLAD’s existing argument. An
explanation of the historical dimensions of marriage throughout world history, by highlighting
same-sex marriage in other cultures, would illuminate the debate surrounding the definitional
argument against same-sex marriage. It is possible for the definitional argument to appear as
267
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circular and unpersuasive because it is not entirely true, whereas the GLAD merely argued that it
is circular and unpersuasive because it does not thoroughly engage the issues. By incorporating
Professor Eskridge’s work into its brief, GLAD could have logically argued that (1) the
definitional argument against marriage is an invalid argument because it ignores the core debate
surrounding same-sex marriage and therefore is circular and unpersuasive, and (2) assuming that
the definitional argument is not circular and unpersuasive and fully examining the argument on
its content, the argument is wrong because marriage has not always been historically defined as
the union of a man and a woman. GLAD should complement the Loving approach to the
definitional argument with a historical exploration of same-sex marriage in other cultures in an
attempt to prove the definitional approach wrong.

iv.

Conclusion

Although a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses does
make sense as applied to same-sex marriage litigation, there are major problems with this
interpretation that are made clear in this brief. I have highlighted four examples of this racial
interpretation in the brief that I think are most important and illustrate the problems of a racial
interpretation of due process and equal protection as applied to same-sex marriage litigation.
These examples demonstrate that same-sex marriage advocates would be best served to steer
clear of race in their arguments. The first example I discussed shows GLAD as wisely avoiding a
focus on race, while the other three examples are racial interpretations containing problematic
dimensions that GLAD failed to adequately address. These examples also show that GLAD
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relied too heavily on a perspective of the scholarly literature that fails to recognize the dangers
imposed by the black/white binary.
First, GLAD admitted that Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, but then
cited several other cases to show that it applies to same-sex marriage litigation. GLAD cited
these other cases to reinforce the notion that Loving is more about marriage than race, and thus
should apply to same-sex marriage. By focusing on Loving as a case about the fundamental right
to choose to marry rather than a racial case and extending the argument to include non-racial
cases, GLAD avoided race as much as possible. This first example I highlight here best reflects
the third perspective in the literature that was discussed in chapter II, including the arguments
made by Professors Hutchinson, Schacter, Moran, Kendell, and others that same-sex marriage
advocates should consider strategies other than racial precedents because of the dangers imposed
by the black/white binary.269 But it is unclear whether GLAD purposely steered away from race
in this particular instance or that they reacted to this literature, as there was no clear pattern of
avoiding race in this brief.
Second, a comparison between the number of states that had legalized interracial
marriage and the popularity of such marriage at the time of Perez and Loving with the current
state of same-sex marriage in the United States may not have been the best strategy. Although
Perez may seem more similar to same-sex marriage cases than Loving, there is still a major
difference between Perez and same-sex marriage cases; other states had legalized interracial
marriage when Perez had decided, while no states had legalized same-sex marriage before
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Goodridge. GLAD would be wise to consider avoiding this particular argument, or at least
consider a different debate on the relevance of the legal and popular state of interracial marriage
at the time of Perez and Loving to the legitimacy of a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection
and Due Process clauses as applied to same-sex marriage litigation. This argument by GLAD
best reflects arguments by the first perspective presented in the literature review; scholars like
Trosino also look at the similarities in the circumstances surrounding both interracial marriage
and same-sex marriage and argue that racial precedent makes sense for same-sex marriage
litigation because circumstances are so similar.270
Third, GLAD rejected the definitional argument against same-sex marriage with the
argument from Loving, that this argument is circular and unpersuasive. This argument could be
stronger, and I suggest that GLAD compliment this with a discussion of the historical importance
of same-sex marriage in different cultures. I recommend that GLAD use to use Professor
Eskridge’s scholarship, which moves away from racial precedent by taking a historical approach
of same-sex unions throughout world history.
Fourth, GLAD compared the historical oppression of blacks and women to the LGBT
community and admitted that LGBT oppression is not as severe as was black oppression. This
comparison was not a wise aspect of the argument, as it reinforced the idea of the black/white
model of civil rights discourse and may harm the gay rights movement. GLAD should reconsider
and refine their approach to the differing levels of severity in the oppression suffered by blacks
and members of the LGBT community so that this difference does not inflame the black/white
binary. I recommend that GLAD use the work of Professors Hutchinson and Schacter, who have
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argued for an approach to same-sex marriage litigation that does not force a comparison of
LGBT and African-American oppression.271
Overall, GLAD’s racial interpretation of due process and equal protection employed in
this brief to advance same-sex marriage litigation relied too heavily on scholarship that fails to
recognize the dangers imposed by the black/white binary. As a result, GLAD failed to address
these dangers in most of its racial arguments. I find that GLAD should look toward the
scholarship of Critical Race, Latino Critical, and Queer theorists who recognize and concoct
solutions to the dangers imposed by the black/white binary.
We continue our examination of the use of a racial interpretation of due process and
equal protection as applied to same-sex marriage litigation by moving onto our second example,
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, in chapter IV.
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IV. THE CONNECTICUT CASE: KERRIGAN V. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HEALTH
(2008)
It is instructive to recall in this regard that the traditional, well-established legal rules and practices of our not-sodistant past…barred interracial marriage…Like these once prevalent views, our conventional understanding of
marriage must yield to a more contemporary appreciation of the rights entitled to constitutional protection.
Interpreting our state constitutional provisions in accordance with firmly established equal protection principles
leads inevitably to the conclusion that gay persons are entitled to marry the otherwise qualified same sex partner of
their choice. To decide otherwise would require us to apply one set of constitutional principles to gay persons and
another to all others. The guarantee of equal protection under the law, and our obligation to uphold that command,
forbids us from doing so. In accordance with these state constitutional requirements, same sex couples cannot be
denied the freedom to marry.272

Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health (2008) provides a second example. The
plaintiffs’ brief in this case shows how the plaintiffs employed a racial interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process clauses and applied it to same-sex
marriage litigation. The plaintiffs’ use of race throughout the brief shows that although the racial
interpretation provides a logical legal model for same-sex marriage claims, certain aspects of that
racial interpretation may impose limits on same-sex marriage litigation. In order to frame my
examination of the racial analysis used in the brief in the context of the procedural history and
rulings of the case, I provide a summary of the facts of the case. I then explore each way that
race is used throughout the brief while highlighting six uses I find most significant, and analyze
each racial interpretation for its applicability to same-sex marriage litigation, its effectiveness in
advancing pro-same-sex marriage legalization arguments, and its treatment by the Connecticut
Supreme Court in the opinion. As in chapter III, I have organized my approach to focus on three
main aspects of the brief: the Due Process claims, the Equal Protection claims, and claims
against the traditional definition of marriage argument.
Although the plaintiffs used a racial interpretation of the equal protection and due process
clauses, including arguments in Loving and Perez, effectively to show that interracial marriage
272
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may act as an appropriate legal model for same-sex marriage litigation, I find six examples of
problematic aspects of the application of this racial interpretation to the same-sex marriage
debate. It is these problematic aspects of the racial connection to same-sex marriage which allow
me to conclude that a racial interpretation of the Fourteenth amendment may not be the best
approach to same-sex marriage litigation. The plaintiffs failed to address two of the six
problematic racial arguments used in the brief. However, I find that the other four examples
actually represent a wise use of race by the plaintiffs; interestingly enough, these approaches
actually signal a shift away from race as the more effective approach in same-sex marriage
litigation.
Unlike the Goodridge brief, GLAD’s racial interpretation of due process and equal
protection in Kerrigan brief best reflects the scholarship of Critical Race, Latino Critical, and
Queer theorists who recognize and devise solutions to the dangers imposed by the black/white
binary on same-sex marriage litigation. Although two of the examples I highlight show a reliance
on scholarship that does not recognize these dangers, the other four examples demonstrate a
move away from race and a reflection of literature that does recognize the dangers, like the work
of Hutchinson and Schacter.273 After examining the briefs in both Goodridge and Kerrigan, I
find an evolution from one perspective of the scholarship to another; although we cannot be
certain that GLAD consciously made a decision to move away from race based on the
scholarship of Hutchinson and Schacter, there is a clear reflection of this scholarship in four of
the examples I highlight in Kerrigan brief. I agree with GLAD’s move away from race in this
brief; I think that the arguments by Hutchinson and Schacter that recognize and attempt to create
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a way around the dangers inherent in the black/white binary represent the most logical criticism
and solution to the problems resulting from using a racial interpretation of due process and equal
protection to advance same-sex marriage litigation.

A. Facts of the Case
Eight couples sought to obtain marriage licenses in the town of Madison, CT. Dorothy
Bean, the Deputy Town Clerk for the town of Madison, denied them marriage licenses because
each couple was of the same sex. The eight couples, represented on the brief by Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), commenced action against the defendants, Dorothy Bean in
her official capacity as Deputy and Acting Town Clerk of the town of Madison, and J. Robert
Galvin in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public
Health. The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the state’s prohibition of marriage for
same-sex couples violated due process and equal protection provisions of the Connecticut
constitution. The plaintiffs did not make any claims under the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs
also sought an order directing Bean to issue marriage licenses to each couple and the Department
of Public Health to register the marriages once they were performed.
While the plaintiffs’ action was pending in the trial court, the Connecticut Legislature
passed a law establishing civil unions for same-sex couples, which conferred on same-sex
couples in a civil union the same rights as married couples. The parties in this case then
narrowed the issue to whether the civil union law and its prohibition of same-sex marriage
passed muster under the state constitution. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant state,
finding that the civil union law rendered a traditional constitutional analysis unnecessary because
the plaintiffs could no longer argue that the state’s laws treated same-sex couples differently than
opposite-sex couples. Furthermore, the trial court ruled that the establishment of civil unions did
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not create a “lesser status” for same-sex couples. The plaintiffs appealed to the Connecticut
Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
The Court found that the “trial court improperly determined that the distinction between civil
unions and marriage is constitutionally insignificant merely because a same sex couple who
enters into a civil union enjoys the same legal rights as an opposite sex couple who enters into a
marriage,”274 and that Connecticut’s “statutory scheme governing marriage impermissibly
discriminates against gay persons on the basis of their sexual orientation.”275

B. A Racial Analysis of the Case Brief
What follows is an analysis of the racial arguments used in the brief. As in chapter III, I have
organized this analysis into three sections: due process, equal protection, and the definitional
argument. Within each section, I analysis the use of racial precedent and analogies in the context
of the broader constitutional or definitional claim.
i.

Due Process

Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, representing the plaintiffs in Kerrigan v.
Commissioner of Public Health, used a racial interpretation of due process doctrine in the
Kerrigan case brief to support their due process argument for same-sex marriage. GLAD cited
the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion from Loving to establish marriage as a civil right, and in
criticizing the trial court’s opinion, wrote that “More importantly, the trial court viewed marriage
as merely a word and ignored its multidimensional significance as an institution with profound
social and cultural importance and deep personal meaning, and to which access is considered a
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civil right.”276 In citing Loving to establish the institution of marriage as a recognized civil right,
GLAD used legitimate precedent and a landmark court decision to frame the argument around
marriage; they did not note the racial aspect of Loving in this particular argument.
However, GLAD then expanded their Due Process argument. As they did in the
Goodridge brief, GLAD cited other cases in addition to Loving to help frame the debate around
marriage. By citing Zablocki and Turner, GLAD hoped to show that “[a]lthough Loving arose in
the context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court affirm that the
right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals”277 and that the “liberty interest
underlying the right to marry is enjoyed by all citizens; this case challenges the deprivation to
gay people of a fundamental right enjoyed by all Americans.”278 Although GLAD cited a
passage from Zablocki admitting that Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, I find
that the next portion of their argument was specifically framed to reject assertions that cases like
Loving do not apply to same-sex marriage litigation because race was more central to the case
than was marriage. For instance, GLAD wrote the following:
Indeed, in Loving, the U.S. Supreme Court did not determine whether there was a fundamental, historic
right to “miscegenic,” or mixed-race marriages. The Court in Zablocki did not ask whether there was a
fundamental right for the poor to marry, nor did the Turner Court assess whether there was a fundamental
right to “inmate marriage.” In these cases, only after acknowledging the well-established and general
fundamental right to marry did the Supreme Court consider the application of the right in the context of the
state’s denial of marriage to a particular class of people.279

GLAD went through case by case to show that in each case, the fundamental, historic, and more
general right to marry was more important to the Court than was the application of that general
right to marry to a particular class of people or minority group. In Loving, the Court first
established the general right to marry, and then conferred that general right to mixed-race
276
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couples. In Zablocki, the Court first cited the recognized general right to marry, and found that it
applied regardless of whether a person had child support obligations. In Turner, the Court again
first cited the general right to marry, and then ruled that this general right to marry applied to
prisoners. GLAD’s logic follows that the general right to marry should apply to same-sex
couples because the general right to marry has been found to apply to these other groups
regardless of their different situations or characteristics from typical married couples. There may
not be a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, but that is not what GLAD argued; rather, the
general right to marry as applied in previous court decisions also applies to same-sex couples.
GLAD’s essential point here appears to be that all of these previous cases apply to same-sex
marriage litigation because they are all premised on the established general right to marry. Thus,
Loving and Perez do apply to same-sex marriage litigation because although they arose in the
context of racial discrimination, they deal with the more important aspect of a general right to
marry, and then with the less important aspect of applying that general right to a specific group.
Race is not important, marriage is important. This is the first major aspect of GLAD’s brief in
Kerrigan that I want to highlight; like in Goodridge, GLAD tried to avoid race in its discussion
of marriage as a fundamental right. Essentially, Loving acts as better precedent for same-sex
marriage litigation when race is taken out of the picture, at least as far as the due process
argument is concerned. And the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed with GLAD’s due process
argument, writing that “the civil union law entitles same sex couples to all of the same rights as
married couples except one, that is, the freedom to marry, a right that has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [and
women] and fundamental to our very existence and survival.”280

280

289 Conn. 135, 139 (internal quotations and citations omitted)

90

ii.

Equal Protection

GLAD also used a racial interpretation of equal protection doctrine in the Kerrigan case
brief to support their equal protection argument for same-sex marriage. Kerrigan differs from
Goodridge in that same-sex civil unions were legal in Connecticut before Kerrigan was decided
by the Connecticut Supreme Court, while civil unions were not legal in Massachusetts before
Goodridge was decided. Thus, the Connecticut court was forced to determine whether civil
unions, which granted the same legal rights of married, opposite-sex couples to same-sex
couples, except the title “marriage,” satisfied constitutional equal protection guarantees. As such,
GLAD needed to argue that civil unions did not satisfy the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection: “This is one of those occasions when the Court must emphasize that equality under
the Constitution cannot be realized through separation… The trial court improperly concluded
that the Plaintiffs had sustained no ‘legal harm’ because the difference between ‘marriage’ and
‘civil union’ is ‘inconsequential’ and equality is not ‘affected by… names.’”281 Thus, GLAD
argued, “the trial court misapplied the basic tenets of equal protection law.” Additionally, they
argued, the trial court improperly treated marriage as a mere word, when it is in fact a very
significant institution in our society.
GLAD criticized and rejected the trial court’s use of the term “legal harm” to describe
equal protection standards. They cited Connecticut Supreme Court precedent showing that
“treatment” is the correct term for equal protection principles: Franklin v. Berger,282 stating that
equal protection guarantees “the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to
the governmental action questioned;” and City Recycling, Inc. v. State,283 which requires that we
examine whether the statute in question “treat[s] persons standing in the same relation to it
281

Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief, 13-14, Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135 (2008)
211 Conn. 591, 594 (1989)
283
257 Conn. 429, 452-53 (2001)
282

91

differently.” GLAD, in arguing that the name of an institution can, in fact, create a
discriminatory classification, employed a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection clause.
They wrote: “No court would immunize from constitutional review a law mandating that staterecognized unions of mixed-race or mixed-religion couples be called ‘civil unions,’ as long as
those couples were granted the same protections as ‘married’ couples.”284 The Loving decision
allowed GLAD to use this racial interpretation; because allowing civil unions yet restricting legal
marriage for interracial couples would create a discriminatory classification based on race, so
allowing civil unions yet restricting legal marriage for same-sex couples creates a discriminatory
classification based on gender or sexual orientation.
The second important aspect of GLAD’s brief in Kerrigan that I want to highlight deals
with civil unions and Plessy v. Ferguson,285 and was not part of the Goodridge brief. GLAD
called civil unions a “mark of inferiority”286 for same-sex couples that resulted from the state’s
action and not merely from the plaintiffs’ subjective feelings, as the state’s defense argued.
Indeed, GLAD noted that the trial court’s reasoning “conjure[d] up a long-repudiated notion
from Plessy v. Ferguson.”287 In upholding separate facilities for blacks, the Supreme Court in
Plessy used the same reasoning:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it.288

GLAD used a racial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to show that civil unions for
same-sex couples do not satisfy Equal Protection standards; GLAD’s argument concerning civil
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unions reflects the scholarly work of Yan and Isaak.289 I find the racial argument as applied in
this particular case to same-sex marriage to be quite logical. Same-sex couples and the LGBT
community are separated from opposite-sex couples and the heterosexual community because
LGBT couples are restricted from the institution of marriage. While civil unions provide
comparable legal rights to marriage, they lack the historical and cultural significance possessed
by marriage. As such, civil unions are a second-class institution compared to marriage. This
separation is similar to the separate facilities provided to whites and blacks at the time of Plessy
v. Ferguson, and the defendants’ arguments are the same. The Court in Plessy agreed with the
defendants’ argument that the state, in granting separate facilities based on race, did not place a
mark of inferiority on blacks. Rather, blacks only felt inferior because it created a mark of
inferiority and placed it on themselves.
Although GLAD made a correct and logical point in noting the similarity in argument
between Plessy and the defendants in Kerrigan, I think they should have gone further. Rather
than restrict the argument to a racial comparison, GLAD should have reached for additional
cases based on non-racial minority characteristics as they did at other points in the brief. The
danger of relying solely on the Court’s reasoning in Plessy to argue that civil unions do not
satisfy Equal Protection can be seen the in the work of scholars like Coolidge (arguing that racial
and same-sex marriage cases are fundamentally different)290 and Wagner (arguing that
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miscegenation laws were mostly viewed as racial laws rather than marriage laws).291 Even
scholars who use racial cases to find that the term “marriage” must be applied to guarantee equal
protection for same-sex couples go further than a mere discussion of the similarity of the
defendants’ arguments in Plessy and same-sex marriage litigation.292 GLAD must take care in
how they approach a racial interpretation of Equal Protection as applied to same-sex marriage
litigation. This civil union argument is also limited by the definitional debate; because GLAD
did not go far enough in rejecting the definitional argument, their racial argument against civil
unions still falls victim to the argument that racial cases do not apply because marriage is a union
of a man and a woman. By relying on additional cases that ruled against separate facilities or
institutions based on gender, prisoner status, etc., I think GLAD’s argument would be stronger
and less prone to assertions that race does not apply to same-sex marriage litigation.
GLAD used a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in a similar fashion in a
discussion of the level of scrutiny with which to examine this classification. The plaintiffs argued
that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage was subject to strict scrutiny because it
discriminated on the basis of sex. They also argued that it was subject to strict scrutiny or, at the
very least, intermediate scrutiny, because it also discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation.
They wrote that “the state subjects the Plaintiffs to ‘segregation or discrimination’ by denying
each one the ability to marry his or her chosen spouse because of sex.”293 For example, if a
woman wanted to marry a woman, the only difference between her choice of spouse and a man
(whom she would be eligible to marry) is sex. Thus, stated GLAD,
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It is…undisputed that a man cannot do what a woman can (marry a man) and a woman cannot do what a
man can (marry a woman). It is “because of” sex that each individual is outside the definition of marriage.
Individuals are plainly “separated” from equal access to a civil institution because of sex.294

GLAD then used race as a point of comparison. Discrimination based on sex “stands on the same
footing as” discrimination based on race, they argued. They continued: “Section 20 no more
permits the denial of marriage based on sex or the separate designation of same-sex relationships
as civil unions than it permits the denial of marriage based on race or the separate designation of
mixed-race relationships as civil unions.”295
A racial interpretation was again applied to GLAD’s same-sex marriage litigation
concerning the equal application debate, and this is the third major point I will highlight. GLAD
cited a great deal of federal and state precedent to support an equal protection claim, that “the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is an impermissible, sex-based classification.”296
The precedent from other state courts was cited to show that there is a sex-based classification in
heterosexual marriage laws. Excerpts from Baehr v. Lewin,297 Baker v. State,298 and Goodridge
were presented. GLAD addressed the decisions of courts that have found that marriage laws do
not discriminate based on sex, and state that these decisions were based on the “simplistic
view…that a legal restriction is not ‘because of’ sex if it applies equally to all persons who wish
to marry.”299 The equal application argument, as used in cases such Anderson v. King Country,300
is the view that both sexes are treated identically because neither men nor women may marry a
person of the same sex. The decisions reached through this argument are “plainly wrong,” argued
GLAD, “because they disregard U.S. Supreme Court precedent that has forcefully rebuffed this
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‘equal application’ defense as a justification under the Fourteenth Amendment.”301 GLAD then
cited several cases dealing with racial discrimination that rejected the equal application
argument, notably McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) and Loving v. Virginia.
McLaughlin essentially rejected the court’s previous ruling in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583
(1883), which had upheld a statute prohibiting adultery between mixed-race couples. The court
ruled in McLaughlin that “Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause…
Judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause…does not end with a showing of equal
application among the members of the class defined by the legislation.”302 Loving “reject[ed] the
notion that the mere ‘equal application’ of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to
remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription of invidious racial
discriminations.”303 Because these cases dealing with racial discrimination rejected equal
application as an adequate means to justify racial classifications under Equal Protection doctrine,
GLAD argued, equal application must also be rejected as an adequate means to justify
classifications based on gender or sexual orientation under Equal Protection doctrine. GLAD’s
use of a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to reject equal application was quite
logical, and was supplemented by a counter argument to the assertion that racial cases are
inapplicable to same-sex marriage litigation.
Indeed, GLAD directly confronted the argument that Loving and McLaughlin are
“inapplicable because the fourteenth amendment was concerned with race discrimination.” This
assertion, GLAD argued, was “illogical and misses the point.”304 It stated the following:
The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage involves a sex-based classification for the same reason
that Loving involved a racial classification -- the exclusion ‘violates the central meaning of the Equal
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Protection clause’ because it ‘proscribes generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different
[sexes].’305

GLAD also directed us to Roberts v. Jaycees,306 which stated that “stigmatizing injury, and the
denial of equal opportunities that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering
discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race.”
And, “state equal protection provisions that prohibit sex-based classifications, such as Section
20, equally abhor race-based and sex-based classifications.”307 GLAD essentially argued that we
should ignore the racial component to cases like Loving and McLaughlin, and focus on the fact
that there is discrimination based on an impermissible classification. Just because Loving and
McLaughlin were based on racial discrimination does not mean that the central components of
their decisions should not apply to same-sex marriage litigation. Again, it appears that GLAD
tried to steer clear of race to maintain the applicability of these racial cases to Kerrigan; a racial
interpretation of Equal Protection here includes keeping a distance from race as a factor. GLAD
also, like in the Goodridge case brief, argued that the equal application defense should be
rejected because constitutional rights are individual, not group rights.
The fourth aspect of GLAD’s racial argument in the case brief that I want to highlight
used race in a different way to supplement its equal protection argument. In response to the
state’s argument that the uniformity of its marriage laws with those of other states is a rational
basis and therefore serves as a justification for barring legal marriage between same-sex couples,
GLAD stated that states have always had different rules regarding marriage eligibility with
respect to various characteristics. GLAD wrote that “historically, states have…had dramatically
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different laws based on race and ethnicity, remarriage after divorce, and competency.”308
Therefore, “insisting on uniformity for only one aspect of the State’s marriage eligibility laws is
irrational.”309 In addition to race, GLAD also mentioned other characteristics including “age,
consanguinity and physical condition.”310 Again, this mention of other characteristics appears to
have been an attempt to leave the race-sexual orientation connection out of the picture. By
grouping race with various other characteristics of minority groups, GLAD fought the notion that
racial discrimination cases do not apply to same-sex marriage litigation. Yes, Loving and
McLaughlin were racial discrimination cases, but the central holdings still apply to any
discrimination case, no matter the characteristic.
GLAD dedicated a large part of their brief to a discussion of the history of invidious
discrimination, oppression, and harsh treatment endured by gays and lesbians. Interestingly,
however, GLAD did not mention the history of oppression suffered by blacks. This is an
important difference from the Goodridge brief, in which GLAD noted that blacks have suffered
more severely than gays and lesbians, and is the fifth significant aspect of GLAD’s racial
argument in Kerrigan that I highlight here. In the Kerrigan case brief, the closest GLAD came to
a comparison is their very brief citation of Roberts v. Jaycees in a footnote: “stigmatizing injury,
and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons
suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their
race.”311 But this citation was not part of GLAD’s discussion of LGBT oppression, and deals
with current oppression anyway. This is another significant move away from race. GLAD noted
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many aspects of the “harsh oppression and systematic discrimination against gay people in our
law and culture over the last century”312:
Until 1961, it was a crime in every state for lesbians and gay men to engage in intimacy with loved ones.
Indeed, it was not uncommon for police to raid gay establishments and arrest people on such charges as
disorderly conduct merely for congregating and socializing. Until the 1970s, lesbians and gay men were
widely regarded as mentally ill and sexual and moral perverts. Lesbians and gay men have been subject to
widespread employment discrimination (including by the federal government) and are among the most
frequent victims of hate crimes. In spite of progress, significant stigma associated with lesbian and gay
people remains today.313

This is a long and clear history of oppression detailed by GLAD. Had GLAD supplemented this
with a discussion of the history of racial discrimination suffered by blacks in the United States,
including slavery, the oppression suffered by the LGBT community would have paled in
comparison. I think GLAD realized this, and tried a different approach. In leaving the history of
black racial discrimination out of the argument, a compelling and disturbing picture of LGBT
oppression was presented. GLAD wanted to present LGBT oppression as unique and disturbing
because it has harmed people, not because it was more or less severe than other forms of
oppression. I think this was a wise approach for GLAD, because it stayed away not only from
race, but from the dangers imposed by the Black/White Binary. The Connecticut Supreme Court,
in its decision, agreed with GLAD’s assessment of the historical oppression suffered by LGBT
individuals: “gay persons…face virulent homophobia that rests on nothing more than feelings of
revulsion toward gay persons and the intimate sexual conduct with which they are associated.”314
Although the court did note that racial and religious minorities have suffered more than
homosexuals, it framed this statement to reflect the severity of LGBT oppression, stating that
“only racial and religious minorities have suffered more intense and deep-seated than
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homosexuals” (emphasis added),315 and adding that gays and lesbians face “unique
challenges”316 to their social integration.

iii.

Definitional Argument

GLAD confronted the definitional argument against same-sex marriage by appealing to
the racial interpretation of Equal Protection from Loving. GLAD first criticized the reasoning
typically employed to advance the definitional argument against same-sex marriage:
The tautology—that marriage must remain a heterosexual only institution because marriage has been a
heterosexual institution – vitiates the equality and liberty guarantees and thwarts the process of
constitutionalism itself. The Connecticut Constitution would be an “atrophied” and “static” document,
frozen in time, if citizens could be treated unequally solely based on legislators’ personal beliefs about a
past history of exclusion.317

GLAD’s rejection of the tautology used to promote the definitional argument was simple
enough; it used the same reasoning as the Loving court did in rejecting the definitional argument
against interracial marriage. However, GLAD extended the argument by specifically citing
rejections of this particular tautology by past courts. It noted the finding by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in 2003 that “[I]t is circular reasoning, not analysis, to maintain that
marriage must remain a heterosexual institution because that is what it historically has been.”318
It also noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence, which stated that “neither history
nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.”319
It is worth noting that in rejecting the definitional argument, GLAD did not rely upon
Loving directly. Rather, it relied upon other cases that specifically concern LGBT discrimination
and same-sex marriage that had already used the reasoning in Loving to reject the definitional
315
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argument as applied to LGBT rights litigation. Furthermore, GLAD did not limit its discussion of
past cases rejecting the definitional argument to racial cases. For example, it referred to United
States v. Virginia,320 to show that the historical exclusion of women from certain professions
based on stereotypical beliefs represents “impermissible grounds to deny equal opportunity to
women.”321 It is clear that once again, GLAD sought to steer clear of race. It attempted to
establish a clear precedent of court opinions that have already used the reasoning in Loving in
that particular way, and it noted discrimination based on characteristics other than race to show
that for many types of discrimination, the definitional argument has been rejected.
However, like in the Goodridge brief, I find GLAD did not go far enough in rejecting the
definitional argument against same-sex marriage, and this is the sixth major aspect of the
GLAD’s racial argument that I highlight. GLAD’s argument attacked the reasoning of the
definitional argument as flawed and illogical, and noted a judicial precedent that has rejected this
reasoning in various discrimination cases. However, GLAD’s brief could be stronger if it showed
that the assertion that marriage is, by definition, a union between a man and a woman, is false. I
suggest that GLAD explore the historical argument advanced by Professor Eskridge, and note
that same-sex unions have been an important aspect of many cultures and civilizations in world
history. A discussion of Professor Eskridge’s argument, coupled with an attack on the logic of
the definitional argument, would create a much stronger brief.

C. Conclusion
GLAD used a racial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses to advance its same-sex marriage litigation on three grounds: due
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process, equal protection, and a rejection of the definitional argument against same-sex marriage.
While GLAD’s racial interpretation as applied to same-sex marriage litigation appears logical
and effective—and in most cases I agree that a very strong argument is made—there remain
problems with applying racial issues and cases to same-sex marriage litigation. GLAD’s
treatment of race as applied to same-sex marriage litigation in the Kerrigan brief shows that
while racial cases like Loving may serve as a logical legal model for same-sex marriage
litigation, there are major problems inherent in this argument that forced GLAD to move away
from race as much as possible.
The main problem I find with GLAD’s brief is that it did not go far enough in
confronting the definitional argument against same-sex marriage. GLAD should use Professor
Eskridge’s historical exploration of same-sex unions in an attempt to prove the definitional claim
false. Additionally, GLAD’s racial approach toward rejecting civil unions was lacking; a
discussion of other non-racial cases that have rejected the “separate but equal” doctrine is
necessary in order to move away from race and assertions that race does not apply to the samesex marriage debate. This racial argument is too reflective of scholars like Isaak who employ
racial precedent to argue that civil unions for same-sex couples do not satisfy an equal protection
guarantees.322
Most of the other racial approaches in this brief were stronger, and I agree with these
other approaches because they appear to have limited the negative impact of the black/white
binary on the same-sex marriage debate. Interestingly enough, these stronger approaches all aim
to avoid race to a certain extent. In admitting that Loving arose in the context of racial
discrimination, GLAD quickly pointed out several other non-racial cases dealing with the
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fundamental right to marry. This showed that the central holding of Loving applied to the samesex marriage debate while essentially leaving race out of the picture. In confronting the argument
that the equal application debates in Loving and McLaughlin are not applicable to same-sex
marriage litigation, GLAD emphasized the marriage aspects of these two cases rather than the
racial aspects. In rejecting the state’s argument that uniformity of marriage is a rational basis,
GLAD steered away from race by noting several other non-racial examples of how different
marriage laws have been historically, state by state. And, perhaps most importantly, GLAD did
not compare LGBT oppression with black racial oppression. This allowed LGBT oppression to
stand on its own as oppression, regardless of how severe it was compared to other forms of
oppression against other minority or disadvantaged groups in United States history. This closely
reflects the scholarship of Hutchinson and Schacter, who argue for a new approach to same-sex
marriage litigation that does not rely on a comparison between LGBT and black racial
oppression. This close reflection of Hutchinson and Schacter’s work indicates that GLAD may
have actually relied on this scholarship in the development of the racial arguments in their
Kerrigan brief, and that the reflection of the scholarship in this brief may be more than a mere
coincidence. I believe this also shows an evolution away from race between the Goodridge brief
and the Kerrigan brief, an idea which I explore in more detail in chapter V.
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V. EVOLUTION FROM GOODRIDGE TO KERRIGAN: THE BLACK/WHITE BINARY,
CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
So what can we make of these findings? What does our examination of two case briefs
from recent same-sex marriage court opinions reveal about the effectiveness and appropriateness
of using interracial marriage and a racial interpretation of Due Process and Equal Protection
doctrine as a model for same-sex marriage litigation? And can our findings from each brief be
logically integrated to form one thesis?
First of all, I have found that same-sex marriage proponents and organizations like
GLAD are able to make strong, clear, and logical arguments supporting that legalization of
same-sex marriage based precedent set by interracial marriage cases like Loving v. Virginia.
There are certainly similarities between the debate over miscegenation in the 1960s and the
debate over same-sex marriage today, and race was a factor in discrimination, and still is in many
aspects of our society, just as sexual orientation is certainly a factor in discrimination and has
been for many years. Many of GLAD’s arguments in both the Goodridge and Kerrigan briefs
echoed the arguments of the numerous scholars who employ a racial element in support of samesex marriage.323 And the fact that a significant majority of scholars who research in this area
323
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support the use of a racial interpretation of Due Process and Equal Protection doctrine as an
appropriate legal model for same-sex marriage litigation suggests that it may actually be quite
easy to make a strong argument to legalize same-sex marriage based on interracial marriage
precedent.
But using race does impose certain limits on same-sex marriage litigation, and this is
clear from my examination of the briefs. Looking generally at the cases, the state supreme courts
of Massachusetts and Connecticut both ruled in favor of the plaintiffs GLAD represented, but we
must look specifically at the arguments used in the briefs to see the limits imposed. While some
of GLAD’s arguments openly exposed these limits as major weaknesses, it is clear that in some
arguments, even though the limits are exposed, GLAD actually worked to prevent the limits by
moving away from race. Some of these arguments are the same in both cases, while some are
approached quite differently, and may mark a shift in how race is approached and applied to
same-sex marriage litigation. I highlight here what I feel are the four most important racial
arguments made in the briefs.
A common argument advanced by anti-same sex marriage scholars like Coolidge and
Wagner is that Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination and therefore does not apply
to the same-sex marriage debate because race was more central to Loving than was marriage. In
the briefs for both Goodridge and Kerrigan, GLAD focused on marriage cases that did not
involve racial minorities. GLAD moved away from race to show that the central holding about
marriage in Loving did, in fact, apply to same-sex couples because it applied to everyone.
The racial approach taken to reject the definitional argument against same-sex marriage
was similar in both the Goodridge and Kerrigan briefs, although in both cases GLAD failed to
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go far enough. GLAD rejected the definitional argument as “circular and unpersuasive,” just as
Loving rejected the definitional argument against interracial marriage. As mentioned earlier, I
suggest in both briefs that GLAD supplement their attacks on the reasoning of the definitional
argument with Professor Eskridge’s discussion of the historical significance of same-sex unions.
This would make GLAD’s argument stronger; in addition to attacking the reasoning, they could
add that ‘even assuming the argument is logical, it is clearly false because the traditional
definition of marriage has not always been a union between a man and a woman.’
Several arguments are approached differently in the two briefs; some are present in one
but not the other. For example, in the Kerrigan brief, GLAD rejected the state of Connecticut’s
argument that the uniformity of the state’s marriage laws to other states’ marriage laws is a
rational basis. This was not mentioned by GLAD in the Goodridge brief, probably because
Massachusetts did not make an argument about the uniformity of its marriage laws with other
states. In the Kerrigan brief, however, GLAD steered away from race by noting several nonracial cases, in additional to racial cases, in which marriage laws were shown to have a history of
being very different from state to state.
The most significant shift from the Goodridge brief to the Kerrigan brief centers around
the historical oppression suffered by both blacks and LGBT individuals; debates about the
comparison of the severity of oppression suffered by different minority groups have been central
in the literature on the Black/White Binary and Latino Critical Legal Theory, including work by
Juan Perea, Rachel Moran, Darren Hutchinson, and Jane Schacter. In the Literature Review, I
noted that a comparison between the two briefs would reveal an evolution in GLAD’s use of a
racial interpretation of due process and equal protection that reflects Hutchinson’s and Schacter’s
arguments. In the Goodridge brief, GLAD discussed the history of LGBT discrimination, and
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openly compared it to discrimination suffered by other groups, like blacks and women; GLAD
admitted that LGBT oppression was not as severe as black oppression. I think this was a terrible
strategy, as an open admittance that black oppression is more severe than LGBT oppression only
reinforces and furthers ingrains the black/white binary into our civil rights discourse and risks a
more difficult process of achieving rights for the LGBT community, as a comparison to black
oppression is then forced to justify one’s eligibility for civil rights. However, in the Kerrigan
brief, GLAD provided a detailed account of oppression suffered by gays and lesbians, but did not
include an account of black oppression. There was no admittance that black oppression was more
severe than LGBT oppression, no comparison to black oppression, not even a mention of black
oppression or slavery. This was quite a significant shift in approach from the Goodridge brief to
the Kerrigan brief, and I think it symbolized a growing recognition of the dangers imposed by
the black/white binary and, more generally, the limits imposed by applying a racial interpretation
of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses on same-sex marriage litigation. GLAD, in the
Kerrigan brief, appears to have followed the views of Professor Hutchinson, who wrote that
Gay and lesbian legal theorists and political activists should advocate sexual equality by addressing the
many harms sexual subordination causes. These harms require legal and political remedies for their own
sake—without reference to the rights and injuries of black heterosexuals…Multidimensionality provides a
more effective framework for discussing these harms…[It] portrays these harms without diminishing—but
rather, acknowledging and emphasizing—the importance of race and other sources of empowerment and
disempowerment.324

Hutchinson believes, and I agree, that harms to sexual minorities should stand on their own
without being compared to more severe racial oppression. And Hutchinson’s new discourse fits
well with Schacter’s test325 to determine the legitimacy of civil rights claims: “[whether] social
subordination and stigmatization subject gay men and lesbians…to systematic exclusion and
324
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disadvantage at the hands of dominant groups.”326 Hutchinson discusses what we must address in
our discourse (“the many [specific] harms sexual subordination causes”) in order to subject gay
and lesbian experiences to this test. Many of the harms specific to gays and lesbian that are
rooted in sexual subordination, like marriage and parental rights restrictions, housing and
employment discrimination, and the closet, do clearly represent systematic exclusion and
disadvantage at the hands of dominant groups. By keeping a comparison to the AfricanAmerican civil rights experience out of the picture, we rid ourselves of a racial analogy that
imposes enormous limits on the ability of gays and lesbians to achieve civil rights appropriate to
their needs. GLAD in the Kerrigan brief highlighted only gay and lesbian oppression, so that this
oppression could stand by itself as harmful and deserving of redress and relief without the
requirement of meeting a certain standard of severity.
Because racial precedents impose dangers to the same-sex marriage movement, a case
like Romer v. Evans also deserves some attention and consideration as a possible alternative
solution. Romer, as discussed in chapter I, dealt with discrimination against individuals based on
sexual orientation, and obviously was not a racial case like Loving or Perez. Romer has been
perceived as a victory for the gay rights movement by many gay rights advocates and scholars.
But Romer has not been very widely cited beyond Lawrence v. Texas because of its anomalous
nature. Justice Kennedy, in writing the majority opinion in Romer, treated the Colorado
Amendment struck down by the Court as a unique law that dehumanized gays and lesbians. In
doing so, he eliminated the need to look at issues of strict scrutiny and avoided the question of
whether gays and lesbians are a suspect class.327 Looking at Romer from this perspective, one
must question the authority of this decision as applied to later same-sex marriage litigation and
326
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consider its limited reach and potentiality to extend to other LGBT legal concerns. Nonetheless, I
feel as though a further and more thorough investigation into the use of Romer in recent samesex marriage litigation would present a better understanding of Romer’s role in and implications
for such litigation. Perhaps there is a way in which Romer could be used more productively and
effectively than cases like Loving because it avoids the dangers imposed by the black/white
binary.
Although I certainly believe my findings to be accurate and significant, I must confess
that my research, although thorough and exhausting, is but a small speck within the universe of
potential future research that could add to and expand upon my own. I hope I have added to the
existing scholarly literature in a meaningful way by examining appellants’ briefs of same-sex
marriages cases to explore how LGBT activists have used interracial marriage and race in
general as an appropriate legal model for same-sex marriage litigation, and whether the use of a
racial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
as applied to same-sex marriage litigation is a wise strategy. I only regret that the limited scope
and resources of this project prevented me from pursuing other interesting and potentially
significant aspects to various civil rights and legal debates that sprang up along the way. For
example, I became interested by various debates within the LGBT community concerning the
importance of marriage legalization on the gay rights agenda, as well as certain historical debates
about marriage. These debates all have many dimensions, and volumes could be added to the
volumes of literature that already exist.
I also believe my conclusions could be developed further; for example, further research
could generate more effective strategies in combating the limits to a racial interpretation I have
exposed here. I suggest, particularly, a similar examination of the appellant brief submitted by
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Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in Varnum v. Brien to see how Lambda Legal
employed a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection and to what extend it
considered the limitations of a racial analogy in the brief. It would be interesting to see if
Lambda Legal continued GLAD’s apparent practice of moving away from race. Or perhaps there
is a way to use interracial marriage as a precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage
without exposing the dangers of the black/white binary? Perhaps someone can develop an
effective method to fulfill Professor Hutchinson’s desire for more discussion of race within the
dialogue of gay and lesbian legal theory without portraying blacks and gays as two separate
groups and without masking the multidimensionality of oppression. Or perhaps the journey that
should be shared by race and sexual orientation in the arena of marriage rights is condemned to a
less fortunate fate, as Professor Victor C. Romero suggests: “the hardships faced by gay and
lesbian couples who want to legitimize their relationships through state-recognized marriage
mirror the struggles of interracial couples during the heyday of the Civil Rights
Movement…[but] race and sexual orientation may be doomed to follow separate, and hardly
ever analogous, paths.”328
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